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4 
Introduction 
Videogames have come a long way since PONG for Atari was introduced in 1972.
1
  The
industry has advanced from simplistic 8-bit geometric shapes descending from players’ screens 
(Tetris)
2
 and a side-scrolling, overall-clad plumber saving a princess in a faraway land (Super 
Mario Bros.).
3
  Today, the global videogame industry is a $67 billion enterprise, consisting of
hardware (gaming consoles like Nintendo and Playstation), software (the actual videogames 
themselves), and secondary markets (online games, mobile phones, and other devices).
4
  The
major players in this enterprise are few—the “AAA” game developers.5  In the videogame
industry, an AAA game is analogous to a Hollywood Blockbuster:  big budgets, big special 
effects, and big profits.
6
For videogame developers, AAA game development is a risky undertaking; according to 
one industry case study, “developing a AAA game is rapidly becoming one of the most 
expensive enterprises humans can undertake, outside of building battleships, launching space 
vehicles, or making movies.”7  The typical cash flow cycle for a AAA game is defined by a
heavy front-end period of negative cash flow, wherein resources are spent and debts are incurred, 
and a back-end period of positive cash flow, wherein revenues are collected.
8
AAA game developers invest millions of dollars over long periods of time to design and 
build games for the various hardware platforms, requiring large budgets and teams to 
1 Mary Bellis, Computer and Video Game History, ABOUT, http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/
blcomputer_videogames.htm (last visited April 8, 2013).
2 TETRIS, http://www.tetris.com/ (last visited April 8, 2013).
3 MARIO, http://mario.nintendo.com/ (last visited April 8, 2013).
4 John Gaudiosi, New Reports Forecast Global Video Game Industry Will Reach $82 Billion By 2017, 
FORBES (Jul. 18, 2012, 11:35 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johngaudiosi/2012/07/18/new-
reportsforecasts-global-video-game-industry-will-reach-82-billion-by-2017/ (last visited April 8, 2013).
5 Polygon Staff, The State of Games: State of AAA, POLYGON (Jul. 2, 2012, 5:03 PM), http://
www.polygon.com/2012/10/1/3439738/the-state-of-games-state-of-aaa (last visited April 8, 2013).
6 Juuso, What Are AAA Titles?, GAME PRODUCER BLOG (May 26, 2006), http://
www.gameproducer.net/2006/05/26/what-are-aaa-titles/ (last visited April 8, 2013).
7 Polygon Staff, The State of Games: State of AAA, POLYGON (Jul. 2, 2012, 5:03 PM), http://
www.polygon.com/2012/10/1/3439738/the-state-of-games-state-of-aaa (last visited April 8, 2013).
8 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 37.
5 
successfully complete the task.
9
  After months, and possibly years, these developers hope (and,
in fact, require) that their hard work results in big sales—otherwise, they may find themselves in 
a situation like that of former powerhouse, THQ Inc. (THQ), once a premiere developer of 
videogames for the global market.
10
9 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 37.
10 Marc Graser, Vidgame publishers see profit despite slump, VARIETY (May 15, 2012, 5:48 PM), http://
variety.com/2012/digital/news/vidgame-publishers-see-profit-gains-despite-slump-1118054077/(last 
visited April 8, 2013).
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The Structure and Operations of THQ 
THQ,
11
 founded in 1989, was a conglomerate in the videogame industry.
12
  It operated in
tandem with a network of domestic subsidiaries and foreign affiliates, as well as other important 
players in the industry, to develop, market, and distribute AAA games.  Since its inception,
13
THQ had been relatively successful in producing many popular titles, generating large revenues, 
and functioning internationally; however, over the last few years it saw its financial condition 
deteriorate. 
Organizational Structure 
Domestic Subsidiaries and Foreign Affiliates 
THQ employed a complex organizational structure to facilitate its business operations 
and international dealings.
14
  Domestically, it was the parent of four subsidiary corporations:
Volition, Inc. (Volition),
15
 THQ Digital Studios Phoenix, Inc. (THQ Phoenix),
16
 THQ Wireless,
Inc. (THQ Wireless),
17
 and THQ Vigil Games, Inc. (Vigil);
18
 all of which THQ wholly owned.
19
11 Voluntary Petition - Page 1 (Principal Place of Business: 29903 Agoura Road, Agoura Hills, California 
91301, Los Angeles County).
12 Voluntary Petition - Annex 1 (Aliases: Heavy Iron Studios; Helixe; Sandblast Games, fka Cranky 
Pants Games; ValuSoft; Concrete Games; Kaos Studios; Incinerator Studios; ValuSoftArcade.com, fka 
SlingDot; Paradigm Entertainment; Elephant Entertainment; THQ San Diego).
13 THQ was a Delaware corporation formed in 1997. (THQ - Delaware Division of Corporations - Entity 
Details; Voluntary Petition - Page 1 and Voluntary Petition - Exhibit 1). Prior to January 6th 1998, THQ 
was a wholly owned subsidiary of a predecessor corporation named T-HQ, Inc. (T-HQI) a.k.a. T.HQ, Inc. 
(T-HQ, Inc. FORM POS AM POS 01/09/1998 – Page 3). T-HQI created THQ for the purpose of 
changing its state of incorporation from New York to Delaware. (T-HQ, Inc. FORM 8-K 01/09/1998 – 
Page 2). T-HQI solicited proxies from its shareholders and a merger was approved on its July 22nd 1997 
Annual Meeting. (T-HQ, Inc. FORM POS AM POS 01/09/1998 – Page 3). On January 6, 1998, pursuant 
to the terms of an Agreement and Plan of Merger, T-HQI merged into THQ; THQ became the successor 
of T-HQI, thereby, acquiring all of the assets and assuming all of the debts, liabilities and duties of T-
HQI. (T-HQ, Inc. FORM POS AM POS 01/09/1998 – Page 3).
14 See infra Exhibit A for THQ’s Organizational Chart.
15 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 5 (Incorporated under the laws of Delaware; Operations are 
being Terminated during December of 2012).
16 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 5 (Incorporated under the laws of Arizona).
17 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 5 (Incorporated under the laws of Delaware; no current 
operations).
18 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 5 (Incorporated under the laws of Texas).
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Internationally, THQ owned three foreign affiliates: Relic Entertainment (Relic),
20
 THQ
Montreal Inc. (THQ Montreal), and THQ International GmbH (TGH).
21
Through TGH, THQ also controlled three TGH subsidiaries operating outside of North 
America: THQ (UK) Ltd. (THQUK), THQ (Holdings), Ltd. (THQH),
22
 and THQ Software
Development–Shanghai (THQ Shanghai).23  THQH,24 like its parent TGH, was a holding
company for two of its own subsidiaries:  THQ Entertainment GmbH (TGHE)
25
 and THQ France
S.a.r.l. (THQ France).
26
Development Subsidiaries 
THQ largely conducted its international business operations, e.g., its AAA game 
development, marketing, product distribution, and related services, through its subsidiaries.  For 
purposes of software development, THQ used an internal development team known as the 
Development Subsidiaries, composed of its domestic subsidiaries Volition, THQ Phoenix, and 
Vigil; THQ’s foreign affiliates Relic and THQ Montreal; and THQ Shanghai.27  The
Development Subsidiaries operated development studios across the United States in Champaign, 
19 Voluntary Petition - Consolidated List of Equity Security Holders; Voluntary Petition - Consolidated 
List of Equity Security Holders (THQ owns 100% of the equity in these subsidiaries).
20 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 6 (Relic has done business as THQ Canada, Inc.).
21 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 6 (A Swiss company).
22 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 7 (THQUK and THQH are both incorporated under the laws of 
the United Kingdom); Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 7, 9 (THQUK, THQH and TGH are the 
“European Subsidiaries” of THQ).
23 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 7-9 (TGH owned 100% of the equity in these three subsidiaries).
24 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 7; Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 9 (From THQ’s 
perspective, both TGHE and THQ France are second-tier European Subsidiaries).
25 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 7 (Incorporated under the laws of Germany).
26 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 7 (Incorporated under the laws of France).
27 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 63.
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Illinois; Phoenix, Arizona;
 28
 Austin, Texas; Vancouver, British Columbia; Montreal, Quebec;
and Shanghai, China.
29
Product Distribution Subsidiaries 
For purposes of marketing, product distribution, and related services, THQ used its 
foreign affiliates and their subsidiaries.  For example, Relic collected payments from THQ’s 
customers in Canada;
30
 TGH administered, on a consolidated basis, a “cash pooling”
arrangement between the European subsidiaries;
31
 THQUK distributed THQ’s software in the
U.K. and functioned as the contracting party for THQ distribution agreements in multiple 
countries;
32
 TGHE distributed THQ’s software in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland;33 and
THQ France distributed THQ’s software in France and directed marketing for the Netherlands 
through its subsidiary, THQ Benelux (a third-tier European Subsidiary).
34
Business Operations 
Software Development 
THQ operated principally in the videogame industry developing, marketing, and 
distributing AAA games for a broad range of gaming platforms:  videogame consoles for the 
home; hand-held consoles; wireless devices (e.g., mobile phones, mobile media players, tablet 
computers, etc.); and personal computers.
35
  Throughout its existence, THQ generated large
revenues from popular titles that it created or acquired,
36
 e.g., the Saints Row Series,
37
 Company 
28 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 5 (THQ Phoenix closed the Phoenix, Arizona development 
studio in August of 2011).
29 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 5-6, 8.
30 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 64.
31 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 7.
32 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 7.
33 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 7.
34 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 7.
35 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 10.
36 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 10.
37 SAINT’S ROW, http://www.saintsrow.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (an action-adventure game 
featuring the exploits of gang members including acts of violence and the use of weapons when 
completing tasks).
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of Heroes,
38
 Homefront,
39
 and Darksiders.
40
  THQ also generated revenues from licensing
agreements with World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. (WWE), related to the World Wrestling 
Entertainment title;
41
 Games Workshops PLC, related to the Warhammer 40,000 title;
42
 and 4A
Ltd. and Dmitry Glukhovsky, related to the Metro:  Last Light title.
43
 
THQ developed AAA games using its Development Subsidiaries, as well as outside game 
developers and vendors.
44
  The Development Subsidiaries developed these games at various
studios in the United States, Canada, and China.  To supplement the work of the Development 
Subsidiaries, THQ also contracted with third-party entities for work it could not efficiently or 
effectively perform on its own.
45
Product Distribution and Related Services 
To disseminate its products in the global videogame market, THQ’s business operations 
included product distribution and other related services.  For tangible products in the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico, THQ and Relic employed a simple distribution tree structure; they 
sold directly to primary distributors, which included mass merchandisers, consumer electronic 
stores, discount warehouses, and national retail chain stores.  These primary distributors 
38 COMPANY OF HEROES, http://www.relic.com/games/company-of-heroes/ (last visited April 8, 2013) (a 
war-strategy videogame set in WWII Europe featuring first-person shooter style gameplay).
39 HOMEFRONT, http://www.ign.com/games/homefront-2/pc-118311 (last visited April 8, 2013) (a 
firstperson shooter videogame set in a near-future North Korean military occupation of the United States).
40 DARKSIDERS, http://www.thq.com/us/darksiders2/360 (last visited April 8, 2013) (an apocalyptic action 
videogame featuring fantasy storylines and battles).
41 Declaration in Support of Deal with WWE and Take Two Paragraph 4 (THQ’s exclusive licensing 
agreement with WWE requires that it develop videogames for WWE through 2017).
42 WWE, http://wwe.thq.com/ (last visited April 8, 2013) (the official videogame for the World Wrestling 
Entertainment group where gamers play as their favorite WWE athlete and compete in entertainment-style 
wrestling competitions).
43 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 10.
44 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 63, 152.
45 THQ retains the services of programming specialists responsible for creating technical features, 
addressing technical issues, and providing related support for THQ products. (Declaration of Brian Farrell 
Paragraph 152). THQ retains separate vendors for animations and videos, known as cinematics; visual and 
aesthetic components; audio production; and key software components. (Declaration of Brian Farrell 
Paragraph 153). Outside game developers assume such a unique role in the development process that they 
become difficult to replace. (Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 152).
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subsequently sold to smaller regional retailers and secondary distributors; the secondary 
distributors sold to clients of their own, like grocery and drug stores.
46
  For tangible products in
Europe and Asia,
47
 THQ relied on its European Subsidiaries to handle international publishing
and distribution activities.
48
For non-tangible products, i.e., products that were available only for digital download, 
THQ used digital distribution methods.  For example, THQ relied on the digital distribution 
services provided by major gaming system entities, e.g., Sony Computer Entertainment 
Playstation Network, Microsoft’s Xbox Live, Xbox Live Arcade, and Apple’s App Store.49
Consumers could download the games from these services directly to their gaming platforms. 
THQ similarly provided third-party digital distribution of its software through services like 
Amazon.com, Electronic Arts’ Origin, and Valve Software’s Stream.50
Marketing 
Despite principally operating to produce and distribute videogames, marketing was a 
major part of THQ’s business operations.  THQ employed two major marketing operations:  first, 
marketing directly to consumers through independent service providers, and second, marketing 
indirectly to consumers through THQ’s primary distributors. 
For its direct marketing operations, THQ relied on independent service providers.  These 
independent service providers created a variety of marketing schemes; some created and 
maintained THQ’s corporate websites, some created and maintained brand specific websites for 
specific titles, others maintained and operated social media channels and forums.  THQ took 
advantage of these direct-to-consumer schemes to distribute updates and other information about 
its games, provide links to retailers that carry its products, and provide social forums where users 
could communicate with one another and with THQ’s management.51  Other independent service
providers operated in more traditional marketing capacities; they created promotional videos, 
46 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 11, 83.
47 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 12 (Over 80 different territories).
48 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 12.
49 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 13 (Each manufacturer delivers videogame content as digital 
information, predominantly through broadband internet).
50 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 13.
51 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 156.
11 
trailers, and television commercials, as well as tangible advertising content and promotional 
materials, like printed advertisements and cardboard cut-outs.
52
 For its indirect marketing operations, THQ negotiated a system of incentives for its 
primary distributors with the goal of driving consumer sales, developing and sustaining its 
positive reputation, engendering customer loyalty, ensuring customer satisfaction, meeting 
competitive pressures, and generating goodwill.
53
  THQ’s incentive system was made up of price
protection plans, co-operative advertising, back-end rebates, defective product credits, freight 
rebates, and special circumstance discounts, among other programs.
54
Workforce and Compensation 
For software development, product distribution, marketing, and related services, THQ 
required a workforce that was skilled and experienced with the nuances of the videogame 
industry; it also needed a workforce that could satisfy consumer preferences.  Consequently, 
THQ relied on the service of numerous employees and independent contractors that were skilled 
with management, marketing, sales, technical support, and software programming.
55
  In the
highly competitive videogame industry, THQ retained the service of this workforce by offering 
them fair compensation and industry standard benefits, depending on whether they were full-
time or part-time, permanent or seasonal, salaried or hourly. 
THQ’s Pending Bankruptcy 
THQ’s Fall from Grace 
For over twenty years, THQ balanced its various business operations: software 
development, product distribution, marketing, and related services.  It established a complex 
organizational structure, developed popular AAA games, created a vast supply chain in over 
eighty territories, conducted international marketing campaigns, and developed a skilled and 
experienced workforce.  Unfortunately, between 2007 and 2012, THQ suffered significant 
operating losses resulting from the shifting tastes of the average gamer (i.e., those of middle-
52 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 157 (These promotions started more than a year before the 
release of a title).
53 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 83; Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 84, 95 (Marketing 
programs of this sort have become customary in the interactive entertainments software industry).
54 See infra notes 249-54 and accompanying text.
55 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 99.
12 
aged men)
56
 from kid-friendly fare to the violent “shoot ’em up” style games popular today,
unsuccessful business ventures,
57
 and an operating model that was unable to adapt to unplanned
cash flow conditions.  To combat its financial woes and to stave off its creditors, THQ undertook 
a massive restructuring of its business operations, personnel, and capital structure. 
Shifting Tastes 
On a macro level, the markets that THQ previously dominated—children’s games and 
other movie-based titles acquired through licensing—became increasingly less profitable as their 
popularity fell.
58
  Gamers’ attention instead turned to more “mature” titles, including games
featuring violence, gun-usage, and other adult content.
59
  For example, in 2012, seven of the top
ten best-selling titles were sports or realistic, first-person shooter games, in short, titles 
positioning themselves for more mature audiences compared to the types of games that THQ 
traditionally produced.
60
The popularity of violent videogames has long been controversial, and in late-2012 and 
early-2013, the topic again became part of the national conversation in light of the shootings at 
Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, Connecticut.
61
  Invariably, social scientists, the media, and
the gaming industry rehashed the nexus between the rise in popularity of violent videogames and 
real life violence.  Although the question “Why have violent videogames become so popular?” is 
well beyond the scope of this case study, it should be acknowledged that the top-selling game of 
56 ENTERTAINMENT SOFTWARE ASSOCIATION, Essential Facts About the Computer and Video Game 
Industry (2011) (the average gamer is male, 37 years old; approximately 75% of the gaming population 
is under the age of 50).
57 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 30 .
58 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 30.
59 Ethan Gach, There’s No Way Around It: The Most Popular Video Games Are Violent, VENTURE BEAT 
(Jan. 16, 2013, 6:10 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2013/01/16/theres-no-way-around-it-the-most-popular-
video-games-are-also-the-most-violent/ (last visited April 8, 2013).
60 Chris Morris, Video Game Sales Down $2 Billion in 2011, YAHOO! GAMES (Jan. 12, 2012, 7:03 PM), 
http://games.yahoo.com/blogs/plugged-in/video-game-sales-drop-2-billion-2011-000323900.html (last 
visited April 8, 2013) (the other three “non-mature games” were Just Dance 2, Just Dance 3, and a title 
from the Batman franchise).
61 Sami Yenigun, Video Game Violence: Why Do We Like It, and What’s It Doing To Us?, NPR (Jan. 11, 
2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/11/171698919/video-game-violence-why-do-we-like-it-
and-whats-it-doing-to-us (last visited April 8, 2013).
13 
2012 was Call of Duty:  Black Ops 2 from videogame maker Activision.
62
  Call of Duty is a war-
themed videogame where the gamer takes on a “first-person shooter” role, i.e., from the eyes of a 
soldier; complete with guns, grenades, and knives. This format has become increasingly popular 
(and duplicated by companies like THQ),
63
 and accordingly, profitable, in recent years.
64
Researchers are still exploring why this is the case, and what, if any, effect it has on gamers.
65
  In
any event, Call of Duty represents the quintessential AAA title with regard to its quality, content, 
and profitability. 
Consequently, THQ altered its course, and moved away from its once-popular projects; it 
was once well known for its licensing deals with the Walt Disney Company and for developing 
and distributing games targeting a family market.
66
  For example, THQ’s very first game was
Peter Pan and the Pirates, released back in 1991.
67
  As the popularity of these titles became
eclipsed by more mature games, THQ focused on or developed its other core franchises, 
including Saint’s Row,68 Company of Heroes,69 Warhammer,70 and the WWE line of games.71  
62 10 Best Selling Videogames in 2012, WALL STREET JOURNAL MARKET WATCH (Jan. 10, 2013), http://
www.marketwatch.com/story/10-best-selling-videogames-in-2012-2013-01-10 (last visited April 8, 2013) 
(Call of Duty has been a top-selling game since 2008).
63 See, e.g. SAINT’S ROW, http://www.saintsrow.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2013); RED FACTION, http://
rfg.redfaction.com/index.php (last visited April 8, 2013).
64 Wesley Yin-Poole, Call of Duty: Black Ops 2 makes $1bn a day quicker than Modern Warfare 3, 
EUROGAMER (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2012-12-05-call-of-duty-black-ops-2- 
makes-USD1bn-a-day-quicker-than-modern-warfare-3 (last visited April 8, 2013) (Call of Duty: Black 
Ops 2 made $1 billion for Activision, worldwide, in just fifteen days).
65 Benedict Carey, Shooting in the Dark, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 11, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/science/studying-the-effects-of-playing-violent-video-games.html. (last 
visited April 8, 2013).
66 Luke Plunkett, How THQ Went From Bad to Very Bad, KOTAKU (Feb. 1, 2012, 10:00 PM), http://
kotaku.com/5881479/how-thq-went-from-bad-to-very-bad (last visited April 8, 2013).
67 Luke Plunkett, A History of THQ, 1989-2013, KOTAKU (Jan. 23, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://
kotaku.com/5978508/a-history-of-thq-1989+2013 (last visited April 8, 2013).
68 SAINT’S ROW, http://www.saintsrow.com/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (an action-adventure game 
featuring the exploits of gang members including acts of violence and the use of weapons when 
completing tasks).
69 COMPANY OF HEROES, http://www.relic.com/games/company-of-heroes/ (last visited April 8, 2013) (a 
war-strategy game set in WWII featuring first-person shooter style gameplay).
70 WARHAMMER, http://www.dawnofwargame.com/uk/faq/index/catId/1 (last visited April 8, 2013) (a 
science-fiction battle game with an online component).
14 
However, it failed to produce top-selling titles under its existing stable.
72
  Some industry
commentators noted that this was the case because THQ both failed to conceive its own cutting-
edge games or genres (instead following in the wake of bigger studios like EA, Ubisoft, and 
Activision)
73
 and of those games that were produced, many received only middling reviews from
industry professionals and online reviewers, even if the game quality was relatively comparable 
to the “brand name” titles put forth by the bigger studios.74  As a result of its failed refocusing
efforts, THQ was forced to close two of its international studios and lay off hundreds of 
employees.
75
Unprofitable Participation in New Markets 
During the two years prior to its bankruptcy filing, THQ rolled out a new multi-pronged 
strategy, identifying possible new business initiatives around its core franchises to bolster its 
flagging profits.
76
 Generally, the company sought to increase its footprint and reinforce its
videogame sales efforts by developing its presence in existing (and expanding) online and 
mobile markets. Additionally, THQ pursued an entry into otherwise uncharted market for the 
company (gaming hardware), believing that buzz around other newly-developed technologies 
would translate to sales of its own products. 
In 2011, the company planned to increase its online and mobile presence in conjunction 
with each terrestrial videogame release (mostly through advertising and interactive efforts), 
including heightening activity on social networking websites like Facebook; increasing gamer 
71 WWE, http://wwe.thq.com/ (last visited April 8, 2013) (the official videogame for the World Wrestling 
Entertainment group where gamers play as their favorite WWE athlete and compete in entertainment-style 
wrestling competitions).
72 THQ Announces Internal Studios Realignment to Focus on Key Strategic Initiatives, THQ INVESTOR 
RELATIONS (Aug. 9, 2011), http://investor.thq.com/phoenix.zhtml?
c=96376&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1594938 (last visited April 8, 2013).
73 Ryan McCaffrey, Where Will THQ’s Games and Studios Go?, IGN (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.ign.com/
articles/2013/01/07/where-will-thqs-games-and-studios-go (last visited April 8, 2013).
74 GameCentral, Why THQ Went Bust—Reader’s Feature, METRO UK (Feb. 2, 2013, 1:00 AM), http://
metro.co.uk/2013/02/02/why-thq-went-bust-readers-feature-3377962/ (last visited April 8, 2013).
75 THQ Announces Internal Studios Realignment to Focus on Key Strategic Initiatives, THQ INVESTOR 
RELATIONS (Aug. 9, 2011), http://investor.thq.com/phoenix.zhtml?
c=96376&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1594938 (last visited April 8, 2013).
76 THQ Announces Internal Studios Realignment to Focus on Key Strategic Initiatives, THQ INVESTOR 
RELATIONS (Aug. 9, 2011), http://investor.thq.com/phoenix.zhtml?
c=96376&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1594938 (last visited April 8, 2013).
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accessibility on mobile videogame platforms (i.e., through the creation of new or conversion of 
existing videogames for smartphones like Apple’s iPhone); and revamping THQ.com, the 
company’s official website.77
THQ pursued entry into the videogame hardware market in 2010.  Four years prior, 
Nintendo, a premier platform manufacturer and videogame development company,
78
 introduced
the Wii console.
79
  The Wii was revolutionary for its time; it uniquely mixed (full-body) motion-
controlled videogaming (compared to traditional handheld joysticks) with online connectivity in 
a way that had not been seen before.
80
  The Wii would go on to sell over eighty-six million units
within five years of its release.
81
  Given the immense popularity of the Wii system, THQ
introduced the uDraw, a gaming tablet intended to compliment Nintendo’s Wii, as well as Sony’s 
PlayStation 3 and Microsoft’s Xbox 360.82
The uDraw was a digital tablet and stylus that can be used by gamers to draw and view 
their work on their television screen.
83
  It paired with the joysticks of Nintendo’s Wii, Sony’s
Playstation 3, or Microsoft’s Xbox 360, by docking each controller into the uDraw tablet.84  Each
77 THQ Announces Internal Studios Realignment to Focus on Key Strategic Initiatives, THQ INVESTOR 
RELATIONS (Aug. 9, 2011), http://investor.thq.com/phoenix.zhtml?
c=96376&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1594938 (last visited April 8, 2013).
78 Company History, NINTENDO (last visited April 8, 2013), http://www.nintendo.com/corp/history.jsp.
79 Wii, NINTENDO (last visited April 8, 2013), http://www.nintendo.com/wii.
80 What is Wii: Overview, NINTENDO (last visited April 8, 2013), http://www.nintendo.com/wii/whatis-
wii/#/overview; What is Wii: Controls, NINTENDO (last visited April 8, 2013), http://www.nintendo.com/
wii/what-is-wii/#/controls; What is Wii: FAQ, NINTENDO (last visited April 8, 2013), http://
www.nintendo.com/wii/faq/#/faq-1.
81 Annual Report 2011, NINTENDO, available at http://www.nintendo.co.jp/ir/pdf/2011/annual1103e.pdf 
(last visited April 8, 2013).
82 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 30; the PS3 and Xbox 360 are two other modern videogame 
platforms that extensively feature games with high-quality graphics and online connectivity, like Wii.
83 uDraw Game Tablet, WORLD OF UDRAW (last visited April 8, 2013), http://www.worldofudraw.com/
tablet.
84 uDraw Game Tablet, WORLD OF UDRAW (last visited April 8, 2013), http://www.worldofudraw.com/
tablet; uDraw Game Tablet: Xbox, WORLD OF UDRAW (last visited April 8, 2013), http://
www.worldofudraw.com/tablet_ps3; uDraw Game Tablet PS3, WORLD OF UDRAW (last visited April 8, 
2013), http://www.worldofudraw.com/tablet_xbox.
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platform offered various games that could be used in conjunction with the uDraw.
85
  Most of the
games, however, were targeted toward a younger audience rather than to the money-making 18-
49 demographic,
86
 an operational decision that was directly at odds with THQ’s realignment
toward adult titles. 
THQ’s foray into this new line of gaming hardware proved disastrous, significantly 
failing to meet the company’s expectations—estimated revenues fell approximately $100 million 
short of THQ’s projections,87 leaving nearly 1.5 million units unsold.88  THQ Chief Financial
Officer Paul Pucino noted that those numbers represented “something in excess of $30 million in 
operating loss” for the company.89  The uDraw was discontinued as of the time of THQ’s
bankruptcy filing.
90
  In 2012, THQ’s failed device, accompanied by overly optimistic projections
and pronouncements about the success of the uDraw, resulted in a class-action shareholder suit 
against the company.
91
  That case is still pending.
THQ’s attempt to enter or further establish itself in these markets represented a common 
shortcoming of the company.  It was simply behind the times with regard to innovation and 
unable to compete with the industry’s giants, EA, Ubisoft, and Activision.  Throwing money 
behind initiatives dominated by the top players was a losing bet for THQ. 
Changes in Management 
85 uDraw Games, WORLD OF UDRAW (last visited April 8, 2013), http://www.worldofudraw.com/
udrawgames.
86 uDraw Games, WORLD OF UDRAW (last visited April 8, 2013), http://www.worldofudraw.com/
udrawgames.
87 Fred Dutton, THQ Details full extent of uDraw disaster, EUROGAMER (Feb. 2, 2012), http://
www.eurogamer.net/articles/2012-02-02-thq-details-full-extent-of-udraw-disaster (last visited April 8, 
2013).
88 Alex Culafi, THQ Explains the Proportions of uDraw’s Collapse, NINTENDO WORLD REPORT (Feb. 3, 
2012, 3:20 PM), http://www.nintendoworldreport.com/news/29179 (last visited April 8, 2013).
89 Fred Dutton, THQ Details full extent of uDraw disaster, EUROGAMER (Feb. 2, 2012), http://
www.eurogamer.net/articles/2012-02-02-thq-details-full-extent-of-udraw-disaster (last visited April 8, 
2013).
90 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 31.
91 Rachel Weber, THQ faces second uDraw class-action lawsuit, GAMES INDUSTRY INTERNATIONAL 
(Jul. 19, 2012, 7:55 AM), http://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2012-07-18-thq-faces-udraw-class-
actionlawsuit (last visited April 8, 2013).; LEVI KORINSKY, LLP, http://zlkdocs.com/THQ-Info-Request-
Form-196 (last visited April 8, 2013).
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In June 2012, THQ brought in new officers to restructure its operations, moving away 
from its failed initiatives around mobile applications and hardware.  Instead, management would 
refocus the company on its core franchises, namely Saint’s Row,92 Company of Heroes,93 
Warhammer,
94
 and the WWE
95
 line of games.
Jason Rubin was hired as THQ’s new President. Rubin was a former principal at Naughty 
Dog, a videogame developer responsible for hit titles such as Crash Bandicoot, Jak and Daxter, 
and Uncharted; each a cartoon or adventure-based children’s game popular in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s—essentially the very type of game that THQ was attempting to distance itself 
from.
96
  Rubin also co-founded media company Flektor, launched in 2007 and purchased by Fox
Interactive Media in 2009.
97
  While at Flektor, Rubin worked closely with business partner,
industry executive, and serial entrepreneur Jason Kay.  Kay was hired as THQ’s new Chief 
Strategy Officer and brought to the table a background in media, entertainment, and technology, 
having years of experience at videogame developer Activision, advising at IGN (a technology 
and videogame website) and media powerhouses News Corp. and HBO.
98
Rubin and Kay were charged with turning THQ around in a short timeframe; realigning 
the company’s strategy to focus on its more popular franchises, eliminating unprofitable 
92 SAINT’S ROW, http://www.saintsrow.com/ (last visited April 8, 2013) (an action-adventure game 
featuring the exploits of gang members including acts of violence and the use of weapons when 
completing tasks).
93 COMPANY OF HEROES, http://www.relic.com/games/company-of-heroes/ (last visited April 8, 2013) (a 
war-strategy game set in WWII featuring first-person shooter style gameplay).
94 WARHAMMER, http://www.dawnofwargame.com/uk/faq/index/catId/1 (last visited April 8, 2013) (a 
science-fiction battle game with an online component).
95 WWE, http://wwe.thq.com/ (last visited April 8, 2013) (the official videogame for the World Wrestling 
Entertainment group where gamers play as their favorite WWE athlete and compete in entertainment-style 
wrestling competitions); Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 33; Evan Narcisse, THQ’s New Boss Says 
No More uDraw, Primary Focus Will Be AAA Games, KOTAKU (Jun. 18, 2012, 2:30 PM), http://
kotaku.com/5919322/thqs-new-boss-says-no-more-udraw-primary-focus-will-be-aaa-games (last visited 
April 8, 2013).
96 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 33; NAUGHTY DOG, http://www.naughtydog.com/games/ (last 
visited April. 8, 2013).
97 Joseph Menn, 2 amateur video sites snapped up, L.A. TIMES (May 31, 2007), http://msl1.mit.edu/
furdlog/docs/latimes/2007-05-31_latimes_newscorp_acquisitions.pdf (last visited April 8, 2013).
98 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 33; Jason Kay, Chief Strategy Officer at THQ, LINKEDIN, http://
www.linkedin.com/in/flektor (last visited April. 8, 2013).
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operations, and reducing its workforce.
99
  Between December 2011 and June 2012, THQ shed
approximately 650 employees; down from 1,400 persons before the massive layoffs.
100
  THQ’s
CEO, Brian Farrell, also announced that he would voluntarily halve his salary to save costs.
101
His salary was reduced for a one-year period from $718,500 to just under $359,250,
102
 although
his total listed income as a result of stock awards, options, and other compensation remained 
nearly $1.3 million in 2011 alone.
103
  Farrell’s employment contract was also amended,
“chang[ing] the compensation that Mr. Farrell would receive if he were terminated without 
‘Cause’ or resigned for ‘Good Reason’ . . . by reducing the lump sum payment component that is 
tied to bonus compensation . . . .”104  Effectively, THQ signaled to Farrell that this would be his
last chance to turn THQ’s prospects around or face termination. 
Recapitalization of THQ 
THQ also announced that it would undertake a reverse stock split in July 2012 in an 
effort to avoid having its common stock delisted by the NASDAQ.
105
  The NASDAQ listing
99 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraphs 32-34.
100 Declaration of Brian Farrell; Form 8-K, United States Securities and Exchange Commission (Jan. 26, 
2012), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/865570/000086557012000005/
a1-26x128xklayoffscompensa.htm (last visited April 8, 2013); Deborah Crowe, THQ Imposes Layoffs in 
Wake of Slow uDraw Sales, L.A. BUSINESS JOURNAL (Dec. 12, 2011), http://labusinessjournal.com/
news/2011/dec/12/thq-imposes-layoffs-wake-slow-udraw-sales/ (last visited April 8, 2013); Ben Gilbert, 
THQ Confirms layoffs of up to 240 employees, JOYSTIQ (Feb. 1, 2012, 5:47 PM), http://
www.joystiq.com/2012/02/01/thq-confirms-layoffs-of-240-employees-across-nine-months/ (last visited 
April. 8, 2013).
101 Brendan Sinclair, THQ layoffs hit 240, CEO takes 50% pay cut, GAMESPOT (Feb. 1, 2012, 2:38 PM), 
http://www.gamespot.com/news/thq-layoffs-hit-240-ceo-takes-50-pay-cut-6349587 (last visited April. 8, 
2013).
102 Form 8-K, United States Securities and Exchange Commission (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/865570/000086557012000005/a1-26x128xklayoffscompensa.htm (last visited April 
8, 2013).
103 Profile: Brian Farrell, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/profile/brian-farrell/ (last visited April 8, 
2013).
104 Form 8-K, United States Securities and Exchange Commission (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/865570/000086557012000005/a1-26x128xklayoffscompensa.htm (last visited April 
8, 2013).
105 THQ Announces 1-for-10 Reverse Stock Split, THQ INVESTOR RELATIONS (Jul. 9, 2012), http://
investor.thq.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=96376&p=irol-newsArticle&id=1711030 (last visited April 8, 2013); 
Andrew Goldfarb, How THQ is Protecting Its Future, IGN (Jul. 2, 2012), http://www.ign.com/
articles/2012/07/03/how-thq-is-protecting-its-future (last visited April 8, 2013). Note that a company’s 
listing on a national exchange such as NASDAQ carries with it intrinsic benefits, such
19 
rules require that a public company maintain a minimum share price of $1 or higher for a period 
of ten consecutive days to remain listed.
106
  Thus, in order to continue listing its stock on the
national exchange, THQ effectuated a one-for-ten split.
107
  Undertaking the reverse split would
convert THQ’s 68.5 million outstanding shares of common stock to 6.9 million shares, and bring 
the company back into compliance with NASDAQ’s rules by boosting the price per share 
tenfold, from approximately $0.60 to $6.
108
  The maneuver was nothing but smoke and mirrors
intended to impress THQ’s strength on investors; however, the split did nothing but artificially 
inflate the price of the company’s stock, and was devoid of any actual change in THQ’s financial 
position. 
THQ’s Cash Flow Condition Worsens 
THQ’s financial and operational maneuvering would be for naught, because it was unable 
to extract itself from its fiscal slump.  THQ had simply become too bloated, unable to adapt its 
business model to a diminished cash flow condition.  As described in detail above, THQ’s 
management decisions failed to effectively anticipate and sufficiently synchronize the cash flow 
cycles for past, present, and future THQ products.  The company misjudged its core audiences’ 
preference for its traditional fare, failed to fully appreciate and cash in on the first-person shooter 
videogame craze, the uDraw fiasco had left it with few sources of up-coming positive cash 
flows.
109
  These poor business decisions, alongside the following internal business conditions,
resulted in THQ hemorrhaging capital resources
110
:
as an active, open market for the company’s securities. Accordingly, delisting THQ’s stock would result 
in serious consequences for the company’s value if its stock could not be readily traded.
106 5001. NASDAQ Listing Rules, NASDAQ OMX, http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/ 
PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp1143&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F 
(last visited April 8, 2013).
107 THQ Announces 1-for-10 Reverse Stock Split, THQ INVESTOR RELATIONS (Jul. 9, 2012), http://
investor.thq.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=96376&p=irol-newsArticle&id=1711030 (last visited April 8, 2013).
108 THQ Stock Price, https://www.google.com/finance?client=ob&q=NASDAQ:THQ (restrict search to 
2012 to see spike in THQ stock price as result of reverse split) (last visited May 28, 2013).
109 See supra notes 58-108 and accompanying text.
110 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 10 (THQ’s is next scheduled to release South Park Universe 
by the end of 2013).
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 THQ relied too heavily on its Development Subsidiaries and from retaining the services
of specialized outside game developers, vendors, and programming specialists, leaving it
highly leveraged for long periods of time.
111
 THQ experienced a resource drain associated with its complex supply chain for order
processing and return services, including the services of common, rail, freight, and parcel
carriers.
112
 Despite falling revenues, THQ poured money into its direct and indirect marketing
operations in connection with its publicity websites and promotional materials, as well as
various incentive programs price protection plans,
113
 co-operative advertising,
114
 back-
111 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 10.
112 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 141-142.
113 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 85 (Under the price protection plan, THQ issued credits to the 
primary distributors for the difference in price between the initial price and the new price of any 
remaining inventory. The primary distributors then used these credits to lessen any outstanding invoices 
they owe to THQ).
114 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 87 (THQ’s primary distributors, like consumer electronic 
stores and national retail chain stores, had direct access to a captive audience of patrons at their local 
brick and mortar stores. These patrons were prime candidates for targeted advertisement because they 
were already consumers of THQ-like products. As such, THQ attempted to take advantage of this captive 
audience by reimbursing its primary distributors for advertising THQ products).
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end rebates,
115
 defective product credits,
116
 freight rebates,
117
 and special circumstance
discounts.
118
 Despite its dire financial condition, the company continued to offer its employees fair
compensation and industry standard benefits, including reimbursable expenses;
119
 sale
incentive bonuses;
120
 product development profit sharing bonuses;
121
 health benefits;
122
115 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 89 (THQ had agreements with certain primary distributors 
allowing them to temporarily reduce the retail price of THQ products. Like the price protection plan with 
other primary distributors, THQ’s goal with this incentive program was to lessen the primary distributor’s 
market risk. By promising to reimburse in the future up to 80% of the primary distributor’s reduction in 
price, THQ incentivized the primary distributor to make bulk orders of products before their public 
release date).
116 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 91-92 (THQ understood that sometimes its products would be 
defective. Upon receiving a claim for defective inventory from the primary distributor, THQ issued the 
primary distributor a credit and these credits were used to lessen any outstanding invoices the primary 
distributor owes to THQ).
117 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 93 (THQ attempted to incentive primary distributors to use its 
complex distribution supply chain. For certain primary distributors, THQ issued a per shipment rebate, 
between $0.05 - $0.30, each time an eligible primary distributor selected an authorized common carrier to 
deliver THQ products).
118 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 94 (THQ gave certain primary distributors discounts on its 
products for special circumstances with the hope that these incentives would be mutually beneficial. For 
example, THQ offered certain primary distributors discounted prices on its products if the primary 
distributor was opening a new brick and mortar store. Moreover, THQ offered some primary distributors 
discounted prices for certain titles if the distributor agreed to purchase a different title, or if the distributor 
purchased a certain quantity of a particular title).
119 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 109-111 (THQ reimbursed employees for legitimate business 
expenses incurred within the scope of employment. The types of expenses that qualified for this incentive 
included: air travel, meals, parking, automobile mileage, office supplies, cellular telephones, related 
business development expenses).
120 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 114-115 (THQ supplemented the base compensation of its U.S. 
sales employees for its quarterly and annual sales. The bonus functioned exactly as it sounds; when a sales 
employee surpasses a certain level of sales within the quarter or year that employee was eligible for 
additional compensation).
121 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 117 (THQ shared its profits for a specific period of time with its 
Development Subsidiaries; the goal being that the Development Subsidiaries would trickle down the 
bonuses to their workforce).
122 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 121-122; Motion to Pay EE Benefits Paragraph 41-42, 44 (THQ 
offered its employees, and their eligible dependents, medical and prescription drug benefits; dental 
benefits; and vision benefits. For all of these different health plans, THQ also offered its employees a
22 
insurance benefits;
123
 vacation and paid-time-off (PTO) benefits;
124
 401(K) plans;
125
 and
flexible spending account plans.
126
THQ’s Debt Financing Comes Due and DIP Financing Offered 
Overextended and under-performing, THQ announced that it would enter into a multi-
year Credit Facility with Wells Fargo Capital Finance, LLC (Wells Fargo)
127
 in September 2011.
Wells Fargo would extend nearly $50 million in financing to the company, increasing its 
borrowing power by $15 million from its previous Credit Facility.
128
  Unfortunately, by
premium cost sharing plan wherein THQ paid a portion of the insurance premiums incurred by its 
employees under their basic health benefit plans).
123 Motion to Pay EE Benefits Paragraph 44; Motion to Pay EE Benefits Paragraph 45 (THQ offered a 
variety of insurance plans: basic life, accidental death, dismemberment, supplemental life, short-term, 
and long-term disability, and other voluntary insurance plans. These insurance plans were packaged in 
different combinations and made available to employees based on their employment level).
124 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 126 (THQ provided all its employees with a certain amount of 
paid vacation time per year, and a certain amount of paid-time-off (PTO) per year. PTO time is intended 
to cover sick days, personal days, and to supplement vacation time when needed. The amount of time the 
employees receive depended on their employment level and their length of employment).
125 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 127-128; Motion to Pay EE Benefits Paragraph 53 (THQ 
maintained a retirement savings plan for all its eligible employees pursuant to section 401 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. THQ’s policy was to always make matching contributions to its employee’s savings 
pursuant to the 401(K) rules).
126 Motion to Pay EE Benefits Paragraph 57-58; Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 129 (THQ 
offered its employees a flexible spending account, e.g., an account wherein employees save a portion of 
their pretax compensation to pay for eligible out-of-pocket healthcare and dependent-care insurance 
premiums, as well as healthcare and dependent-care expenses. Employees realized the benefit of the plan 
by seeking reimbursements for expenses incurred, or by having the account pay healthcare providers 
directly).
127 Wells Fargo secured the credit facility with first priority security interests in nearly all of THQ’s 
eligible collateral (including inventory and accounts receivable and liens on THQ’s real property. 
Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 165. As additional security, Wells Fargo had THQ’s domestic 
subsidiaries Volition, THQ Wireless, and Vigil as guarantors for the credit facility. Declaration of Brian 
Farrell Paragraph 26). Similar to the Well Fargo’s asset-based revolving credit facility, THQ had 
financed its business operations by issuing $100 million in 5% convertible unsecured senior notes to 
various investment entities, i.e., Silverback Asset Management, LLC, Third Avenue Focused Credit 
Fund, and Wolverine Flagship Fund Trading Limited. (Objection to Motion for DIP Financing Footnote 
1; Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 28). The notes were due August 2014. (Declaration of Brian 
Farrell Paragraph 28).
128 THQ Announces New Credit Facility with Wells Fargo, THQ INVESTOR RELATIONS (Sept. 28, 2011), 
http://investor.thq.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=96376&p=irol-newsArticle&id=1610682 (last visited April 8, 
2013).
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November 2012, Wells Fargo informed THQ that it was in default under the terms of the Credit 
Facility.
129
  Wells Fargo notified the company that it had reached its maximum excess
availability amount,
130
 which in turn triggered a fixed charge coverage covenant;
131
 ultimately,
THQ was unable to pay.
132
  Wells Fargo and THQ subsequently entered into a forbearance
agreement in order to avoid a complete default under the Credit Facility.
133
  Wells Fargo agreed
to forbear on THQ’s loan through January 15, 2013, and would continue to make its revolving 
loans to the company.
134
The forbearance agreement also stipulated that Wells Fargo would continually “sweep 
the Debtor’s depository accounts,”135 effectively leaving THQ without operating capital.
Simultaneously, Wells Fargo required that THQ “request new advances to pay expenses” 
129 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 35.
130 In a secured loan agreement, the debtor is permitted to borrow the lesser of the amount of the 
lender’s commitments and the amount of the debtor’s eligible assets (as agreed upon by the parties). 
When the debtor’s outstanding loans fall below the maximum amount it may borrow, that unused 
amount constitutes the “excess.” If the excess reaches a certain amount, certain covenants may be 
triggered under the terms of the agreement. This keeps debtors assuming additional debt under the 
contract and creditors in business.
131 Fixed charge coverage is a ratio used to gauge the ability of the debtor to meet its debt obligations. In 
a loan agreement, a fixed charge coverage covenant sets a limit on how far that ratio can fall. When the 
debtor’s financial position falters and the ratio falls below the contracted for limit, the covenant is 
triggered, requiring payment to the creditor.
132 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 35.
133 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 35; THQ Provides Update on Its Credit Facility and 
Announces Exclusive Negotiations with Financial Sponsor for Potential Financing Alternatives, THQ 
INVESTOR RELATIONS (Nov. 20, 2012), http://investor.thq.com/phoenix.zhtml?
c=96376&p=irolnewsArticle&id=1760963 (last visited April 8, 2013).
134 THQ Provides Update on Its Credit Facility and Announces Exclusive Negotiations with Financial 
Sponsor for Potential Financing Alternatives, THQ INVESTOR RELATIONS (Nov. 20, 2012), http://
investor.thq.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=96376&p=irol-newsArticle&id=1760963 (last visited April 8, 2013).
135 THQ maintained four depository accounts with Union Bank. THQ used these accounts primarily for 
the collection of cash receipts. THQ only deposited cash originating from a particular business line into 
one of the four Union Bank accounts: general customer cash receipts (Declaration of Brian Farrell 
Paragraph 58(a)(1)), Valusoft customer cash receipts, THQ Wireless customer cash receipts, and Paypal 
customer cash receipts. (Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 58(a)). The majority of cash receipts 
received by THQ are general customer cash receipts. (Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 58(a)(1)). 
The four Union Bank accounts were subject to control agreements by Wells Fargo. (Declaration of 
Brian Farrell Paragraph 58(a)).
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through the Credit Facility.
136
  Wells Fargo was draining THQ dry (as creditors exercising their
remedies under the terms of a loan document are wont to do), exhausting all of its capital 
resources, and forcing it closer to bankruptcy.  Internally, it was clear that the company would 
soon fail; the nearest new game was not scheduled to be released until March 2013 and THQ was 
without sufficient funds to continue its operations.
137
  An out-of-court restructuring would not be
possible at this point.
138
Around this time, Wells Fargo and investment firm Clearlake Capital Group (Clearlake) 
agreed to provide debtor in possession (DIP) financing to THQ as needed.
139
  Clearlake was an
“investment firm focused on private equity and special situation transactions,” meaning that it 
focused on distressed companies preparing to collapse under the weight of their pending 
insolvency.
140
  The firm prides itself on “partner[ing] with world-class management teams” of
presumably distressed or bankrupt companies “to provide . . . patient, long-term capital and 
operational expertise.”141  In time, Clearlake would prove to be not only a creditor of THQ
during its bankruptcy, but also the architect behind its eventual sale.  
During this time, Farrell remained (publicly) optimistic, reiterating THQ’s focus on its 
reformed business operations and to continue “bringing [its] games in development to 
market.”142  Despite the rosy announcement to its investors, THQ continued to hemorrhage
capital resources and key personnel, including its CFO, Paul Pucino.
143
  At the time of the
forbearance, industry watchdogs noted that THQ’s stock was trading at only “$1.25 [despite the 
reverse stock split just four months prior], market capitalization [was] at $8.5 million, and 
136 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 35.
137 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 38.
138 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 38.
139 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 38.
140 CLEARLAKE CAPITAL, http://www.clearlakecapital.com/overview.html (last visited April 8, 2013).
141 CLEARLAKE CAPITAL, http://www.clearlakecapital.com/overview.html (last visited April 8, 2013).
142 THQ Provides Update on Its Credit Facility and Announces Exclusive Negotiations with Financial 
Sponsor for Potential Financing Alternatives, THQ INVESTOR RELATIONS (Nov. 20, 2012), http://
investor.thq.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=96376&p=irol-newsArticle&id=1760963 (last visited April 8, 2013).
143 THQ Provides Update on Its Credit Facility and Announces Exclusive Negotiations with Financial 
Sponsor for Potential Financing Alternatives, THQ INVESTOR RELATIONS (Nov. 20, 2012), http://
investor.thq.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=96376&p=irol-newsArticle&id=1760963 (last visited April 8, 2013).
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corporate heads [were] exploring financial strategies with a private equity broker.”144 THQ’s
situation was dire. 
Pre-Bankruptcy Marketing Efforts 
Upon THQ’s determination that its financial condition was unsustainable and bankruptcy 
was on the horizon, and in an effort to preserve what value remained in the corporation, the 
company sought the assistance of an investment management, consulting, and monitoring 
institution in order to maximize its going-concern value.
145
  THQ, now on the bankruptcy track,
began actively searching for a potential “stalking horse bidder” in its Section 363 sale (a 
purchaser who typically generates “greater value than an open auction [by setting] a bidding 
floor, [where] all bids must be greater than the [stalking horse] bid in certain increments”).146
As a general matter, a stalking horse bidder provides several key functions.  First, they 
provide due diligence for the debtor’s assets and establish the terms and conditions of the auction 
itself.
147
  Second, and as a result of their negotiation with the debtor, they act as the base bid for
the auction.
148
  Third, the existence and legwork of the stalking horse bidder will (hopefully)
attract other bidders to the auction in order to obtain a “higher and better” price for the debtor in 
bankruptcy.
149
  However, the stalking horse bidder may impede the sale process, e.g., if the bid
increments are undesirable to other prospective purchasers, or because the breakup fee is too 
high.
150
THQ first engaged Citibank Global Markets, Inc. to raise capital or sell THQ’s assets 
during a three-month period between December 2011 and February 2012.
151
  As a result of this
pre-plan marketing push, Citibank identified twenty-six potential bidders and twenty-nine 
144 Joystiq, THQ in forbearance agreement with Wells Faro, CFO resigns, TECH INVESTOR NEWS (Nov. 
20, 2012), http://www.techinvestornews.com/Gaming/Gaming-User-News/thq-in-forbearance-agreement-
with-wells-fargo-cfo-resigns (last visited April 8, 2013).
145 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 39.
146 Michael J. Davis, 363 Sales in Bankruptcy, 22 DBCA Brief 27, 28 (2009).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 40.
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potential financial backers.
152
  Unfortunately for THQ, only six potential bidders and seven
potential financial backers entered into Non-Disclosure Agreements with Citibank.
153
  And by
the end of the marketing process, none of those entities displayed an interest in purchasing THQ 
either as a going concern or piecemeal (asset-by-asset or “studio-by-studio”).154
Undeterred by its first failed effort to market itself, THQ subsequently engaged 
Centerview Partners, LLC in June 2012 to find an investor to provide liquidity for its business 
operations or alternatively to purchase all or substantially all its assets.
155
  Rubin aligned with
Centerview because he had previously worked with the investment company’s senior advisor, 
Skip Paul, when Paul was an investor in Rubin’s Flektor venture some years prior.156  Building
from the marketing efforts of Citibank, Centerview reviewed THQ’s prospects in the context of a 
bankruptcy sale.
157
  Ultimately, however, Centerview did not continue its pre-bankruptcy
marketing efforts with THQ,
158
 although it remained an advisor to THQ throughout the duration
of its bankruptcy and eventual sale.
159
During this time, industry analysts were also reporting that THQ’s prospects looked grim, 
and that the company’s bankruptcy was looming.160  One commentator posited that “[s]hould
[THQ’s] financial position continue to deteriorate . . . we expect THQ to raise financing through 
an equity sale that could lead to dilution of existing shareholders.  We expect creditors to be 
152 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 40.
153 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 40.
154 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 40.
155 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 41.
156 Ben Fritz, THQ delays games, looks to raise capital, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2012), http://
articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/05/entertainment/la-et-ct-thq-delays-games-raise-capital-20121105 (last 
visited April 8, 2013).
157 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 41.
158 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 41.
159 THQ Receives Court Approval for Amended Sale Calendar, United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/865570/000086557013000002/
a1-8x12pressrelease.htm (last visited April 8, 2013).
160 Adam Gauntlett, THQ Earnings Call Gives Little Reason for Confidence, THE ESCAPIST (Nov. 6, 
2012), http://www.escapistmagazine.com/news/view/120512-THQ-Earnings-Call-Gives-Little-Reason-
for-Confidence (last visited April 8, 2013).
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asked to renegotiate terms at a discount; if they are unwilling, bankruptcy is possible.”161  On a
November 5 investor conference call, Rubin did little to encourage THQ’s shareholders, 
acknowledging that THQ would “no longer provid[e] net sales and earnings guidance.”162
Further, the company would “withdraw[] [its] previous guidance for [FY‘13] in [its] projected 
operating model,”163 signaling to investors and analysts that the THQ was on its last legs
financially. 
In November 2012, THQ consulted with Houlihan Lokey, LLC, as a result of pressure 
from its unsecured note holders, to undertake a marketing process.
164
  That marketing was
ultimately terminated prior to its commencement and the record is otherwise silent regarding 
THQ’s subsequent interactions with Houlihan with respect to its pre-bankruptcy marketing 
efforts.
165
THQ and Clearlake Begin Negotiations 
Regardless of the marketing efforts put forth by Centerview and others, THQ 
independently began formal talks with Clearlake on October 26, 2012, entering into an exclusive 
forty-five day negotiation period, which later was extended to December 17, 2012.
166
  With its
options running low and time running out, THQ seemed poised to enter into an agreement with 
Clearlake, its then DIP lender and soon-to-be stalking horse bidder, unless a better offer 
materialized
167—an offer that was becoming increasingly unlikely to appear the longer THQ
devalued in the market. 
161 Adam Gauntlett, THQ Earnings Call Gives Little Reason for Confidence, THE ESCAPIST (Nov. 6, 
2012), http://www.escapistmagazine.com/news/view/120512-THQ-Earnings-Call-Gives-Little-Reason-
for-Confidence (last visited April 8, 2013).
162 THQ Management Discusses Q2 2013 Results – Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA (Nov. 5, 
2012, 6:00 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/980111-thq-management-discusses-q2-2013-results-
earnings-call-transcript?page=1 (last visited April 8, 2013).
163 THQ Management Discusses Q2 2013 Results – Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA (Nov. 5, 
2012, 6:00 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/980111-thq-management-discusses-q2-2013-results-
earnings-call-transcript?page=1 (last visited April 8, 2013).
164 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 41 Footnote 2.
165 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 41.
166 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 41 (This is not entirely consistent with the Houlihan Lokey 
consultation, but any inconsistency is derived solely from the Farrell First Day Motion).
167 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 38.
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The Asset Purchase Agreement and Sale Procedures 
As a result of their negotiations, Space Investors LLC (Space Investors), a newly-formed 
entity and affiliate of Clearlake, would serve as the stalking horse bidder for THQ’s 363 sale, and 
THQ would be permitted to solicit competing bids from other prospective purchasers.
168
Although discussed more in depth infra, under the pertinent terms of the Agreement, Space 
Investors would pay off Wells Fargo’s secured debt (of which approximately $20 million was 
outstanding), pay THQ $6.65 million in cash (ostensibly used for urgent operating expenses), 
assume another $15 million in THQ’s liabilities, and deliver to THQ a $10 million seven-year 
unsecured note,
169
 payable by Space Investors.
170
In its initial filings, THQ asserted that the sale of assets to Space Investors (or a higher 
bidder) in conjunction with Wells Fargo and Clearlake’s DIP financing was the best possible 
option to retain the going concern value of the company and obtain maximum value for THQ’s 
assets.
171
  The assets would be sold on an “as is” and “where is” basis, with THQ making no
representations or warranties of any kind, nature, or description.
172
  In the event that Space
Investors was not the successful bidder, THQ would pay to Space Investors a $1.75 million 
break-up fee plus expense reimbursements pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement.
173
On December 19, 2012, THQ and Space Investors formalized and executed the Asset 
Purchase Agreement and Bidding Procedures (collectively, the APA), whereby Space Investors 
would “acquire all right, title and interest of [THQ] in, to or under substantially all of the 
[company’s] properties and assets.”174  The APA provided that any person seeking to bid on
168 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 42; Form 8-K, United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/865570/ 000086557012000066/
a12-19x128xk.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2013) (While the First Day Motion states that Clearlake was the 
stalking horse bidder, THQ’s SEC filings indicate that Space Investors (clearly a shell entity controlled by 
Clearlake) would act as an affiliate).
169 The Note provided that Space Investors would deliver to THQ a 7-year subordinated, unsecured note, 
payable by Space Investors to THQ’s unsecured creditors, in the amount of $10M, 2% interest, which did 
not require an earn-out provision.
170 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 43.
171 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 44.
172 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 47.
173 Proposed Asset Purchase Agreement Paragraph 7.5(a).
174 Proposed Asset Purchase Agreement Paragraph 2.1(a).
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THQ’s assets meet certain bid requirements.175  For example, a prospective bidder was required
under the APA’s procedures to submit bids to “the Committee,” which included THQ and its 
counsel, DIP lenders (Wells Fargo and Clearlake), Centerview, and the Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors.
176
  Additionally, bidders were required to provide other documentation
including confidentiality agreements and proof of financial ability to “close the contemplated 
transaction and provide adequate assurance of future performance” of any successful bids for 
THQ’s assets.177  The APA also provided that bidders must seek to purchase all of THQ’s assets
on an “as is, where is” basis and free of any and all encumbrances.178  Bidders who were deemed
qualified under the agreement’s terms were also permitted to credit bid their secured claims, if 
any, under Section 363(k) of the Code.
179
The auction was scheduled, pursuant to the bidding procedures of the APA, to take place 
on January 9, 2013 at the offices of THQ’s counsel in New York, New York.180  In the event that
Space Investors, the Stalking Horse Bidder, was the only qualified bid, no auction would be 
held.
181
  At the auction itself, THQ and its counsel would conduct the auction.
182
  THQ would set
the opening bid as the highest received bid prior to the auction, here the Stalking Horse Bid of 
$2.75 million by Space Investors, and continue accepting bids in increments of $500,000 
thereafter (the overbid).
183
  After all the bids were received, THQ would consult with the
remaining members of the Committee and determine the winner of the auction by considering 
the “financial and contractual terms and the factors relevant to the sale process,” and the bidder’s 
175 Proposed Bidding Procedures Order Part II.
176 Proposed Bidding Procedures Order Bid Deadline Paragraph.
177 Proposed Bidding Procedures Order Participant Requirements Paragraph, Part d.
178 Proposed Bidding Procedures Order Bid Requirements Paragraph, Part i; Proposed Bidding 
Procedures Order “As Is, Where Is” Paragraph (“The sale of the Assets shall be on an ‘as is, where is’ 
basis and without representations or warranties of any kind, nature, or description by the Debtors.”); 
Proposed Bidding Procedures Order Free of Any and All Encumbrances Paragraph (the Assets “shall be 
sold free and clear of all pledges, liens, security interests, encumbrances, claims, charges, options, and 
interests thereon and there against . . . .”).
179 Proposed Bidding Procedures Order Credit Bidding Paragraph; 11 U.S.C. § 363(k).
180 Proposed Bidding Procedures Order Auction Paragraph (THQ’s lead counsel, Gibson Dunn, is 
introduced in the subsequent section of this case study).
181 Proposed Bidding Procedures Order Auction Paragraph.
182 Proposed Bidding Procedures Order Auction Paragraph, Part b.
183 Proposed Bidding Procedures Order Auction Paragraph, Part a; Proposed Bidding Procedures Order 
Auction Paragraph, Part c.
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“highest, best, and/or otherwise financially superior offer” for THQ’s assets, which would bring 
the greatest value to its estate.
184
In any event, a sale hearing would take in the Bankruptcy Court in Wilmington, Delaware 
the following day to confirm the results of the auction.
185
  The winner of the auction would then
be required to consummate the sale no later than January 24, 2013.
186
  If the winner of the
auction failed to consummate the sale, THQ could then accept any lesser (a Back-up Bid) 
without notice or order from the Court.
187
  Although THQ and Space Investors agreed upon these
provisions, some details of the APA would later raise concerns among THQ’s creditors and the 
Court. 
THQ Retains Counsel 
Around the time the APA was executed, THQ entered into an engagement agreement 
with Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor, LLP (Young Conaway).
188
  Young Conaway would act
as THQ’s counsel in all aspects of its chapter 11 restructuring and proposed asset sale with 
Clearlake.
189
  At that time, THQ also sought to retain Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP (Gibson
Dunn) to serve as lead counsel.
190
THQ would later file an application nunc pro tunc
191
 to the petition date because Young
Conaway was retained prior to THQ’s bankruptcy filing, but did not gain the Court’s approval 
until over a month later.
192
  Much of the basis for that motion was supported by the declaration
of Michael Nestor, lead counsel for Young Conaway on the THQ case.
193
  Both THQ’s
application and Nestor’s declaration provided that Young Conaway was an experienced firm 
184 Proposed Bidding Procedures Order Auction Paragraph, Part e. 
185 Proposed Bidding Procedures Order Sale Hearing Paragraph. 
186 Proposed Bidding Procedures Order Sale Hearing Paragraph. 
187 Proposed Bidding Procedures Order Sale Hearing Paragraph. 
188 THQ's Application to Retain and Employ Counsel Paragraph 7. 
189 THQ's Application to Retain and Employ Counsel. 
190 THQ’s Application to Retain and Employ Counsel Paragraph 8. 
191 Translated to “Now for then,” and used to retroactively validate a party’s actions.  
192 THQ’s Application to Retain and Employ Counsel. 
193 THQ’s Application to Retain and Employ Counsel Exhibit A.  
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with regard to bankruptcy and corporate restructuring and it had intimate knowledge of THQ’s 
business and affairs.
194
  Young Conaway would provide services at standard rates (e.g., $675 per
hour for Nestor’s services down to $185 per hour for a paralegal)195 and received an initial
retainer of $100,000 in order to be paid for work completed in connection with preparing and 
filing THQ’s first day motions and any post-filing representation of the company.196
THQ Files for Bankruptcy 
On December 19, 2012, THQ filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy.
197
  The news came as no
surprise to investors and industry analysts, who noted that the filing was “long anticipated.”198
Despite the bleak news, Farrell (publicly, at least) seemed optimistic that THQ’s agreement with 
Clearlake would benefit the struggling videogame company.  In a press release to investors, he 
stated that “[t]he sale and filing [we]re necessary next steps to complete THQ’s transformation 
and position the company for the future, as we remain confident in our existing pipeline of 
games, the strength of our studios and THQ’s deep bench of talent.”199  Rubin echoed this
hopeful sentiment:  “We look forward to partnering with experienced investors for a new start as 
we will continue to use our intellectual property assets to develop high-quality core games, 
create new franchise titles, and drive demand through both traditional and digital channels.”200
Although Farrell and Rubin appeared hopeful that Clearlake would turn THQ around, they failed 
to disclose to investors or the public the (very real) possibility that the company could ultimately 
be dismantled, game by game. 
194 THQ’s Application to Retain and Employ Counsel Paragraph 9.
195 THQ’s Application to Retain and Employ Counsel Paragraph 10.
196 THQ’s Application to Retain and Employ Counsel Paragraph 13.
197 Declaration of Brian Farrell.
198 Daniel Nye Griffiths, THQ Files for Bankruptcy – Promises No Disruption, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2012, 
3:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnyegriffiths/2012/12/19/thq-files-for-bankruptcy-promises-
no-disruption/ (last visited April 8, 2013).
199 THQ Inc. Secures Assets Purchase Agreement with Affiliates of Clearlake Capital Group, L.P., THQ 
INVESTOR RELATIONS (Dec. 19, 2012), http://investor.thq.com/phoenix.zhtml?
c=96376&p=irolnewsArticle (last visited April 8, 2013).
200 THQ Inc. Secures Assets Purchase Agreement with Affiliates of Clearlake Capital Group, L.P., THQ 
INVESTOR RELATIONS (Dec. 19, 2012), http://investor.thq.com/phoenix.zhtml?
c=96376&p=irolnewsArticle (last visited April 8, 2013).
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Clearly both Farrell and Rubin, along with Clearlake, felt that THQ was worth more alive 
than dead, but only time would tell; at the time of its filing, THQ’s market capitalization had 
fallen to somewhere between $11.3 and $8.5 million, down from a high of $2 billion just five 
years prior.
201
  Despite the consistently positive spin, THQ’s downward spiral was evident:  its
stock price had fallen 84% during 2012,
202
 NASDAQ delisted its shares from the exchange,
203
and at least one commentator questioned whether the company could successfully emerge from 
bankruptcy.
204
Operations and First Day Motions 
THQ, as debtor-in-possession
205
 pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code,
206
 filed several
emergency petitions and requests for first day relief (the First Day Motions).  Among them were 
motions for joint administration of the bankruptcy proceedings among THQ and its domestic 
subsidiaries, to maintain its bank and internal accounts, to pay critical vendors, to pay employee 
benefits, and to honor prepetition obligations under certain customer incentive programs.  The 
underlying rationale of each motion was to preserve THQ as a going-concern in order to 
maximize its value during the bankruptcy and to achieve the highest value in the forthcoming 
363 auction.  The legal arguments contained in the First Day Motions were substantially the 
same:  the “doctrine of necessity”207 empowered the Court to issue any order necessary to carry
out the Code’s purpose, i.e., to preserve and protect the value of corporations, with regard to 
201 Daniel Nye Griffiths, THQ Files for Bankruptcy – Promises No Disruption, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2012, 
3:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnyegriffiths/2012/12/19/thq-files-for-bankruptcy-promises-
no-disruption/ (last visited April 8, 2013); Ben Fritz, THQ Files for Bankruptcy, will seek buyer, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/19/entertainment/la-et-ct-thq-
bankruptcy-20121219 (last visited April 8, 2013).
202 Kristin Jones, Game Maker THQ Files for Bankruptcy, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Dec. 19, 2012, 2:45 
PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323277504578189612319581942.html (last 
visited April 8, 2013).
203 THQ Inc. Secures Assets Purchase Agreement with Affiliates of Clearlake Capital Group, L.P., THQ 
INVESTOR RELATIONS (Dec. 19, 2012), http://investor.thq.com/phoenix.zhtml?
c=96376&p=irolnewsArticle (last visited April 8, 2013) (this in spite of THQ’s July 2012 reverse stock 
split).
204 Brett Molina, THQ files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, USA TODAY (Dec. 19, 2012, 3:15 PM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/tech/gaming/2012/12/19/thq-files-for-bankruptcy/1780109/ (last visited April 
8, 2013) (“It’s going to be difficult for them to keep going as a viable publisher.”).
205 See Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph.
206 11 U.S.C. § 1101.
207 See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); see, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); 
In re NVR L.P., 147 B.R. 126 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992); In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821 (D. Del. 
1999).
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maintaining THQ’s operations during the chapter 11 process.208  Further, THQ consistently
argued, and pointed to relevant authority, throughout its First Day Motions that the Court 
regularly sought to preserve a company’s “going concern” value in chapter 11.209 
THQ’s Motion for Order Authorizing the Joint Administration of its Related Chapter 11 Cases 
Given THQ’s organizational structure, a threshold matter to be reached by the Court was 
the consolidation of the several chapter 11 cases into a single matter.
210
  THQ moved, for
procedural purposes, to combine the bankruptcy cases for itself, Volition, THQ Phoenix, THQ 
Wireless, and Vigil, as well as any later filed chapter 11 cases for THQ’s foreign affiliates, as 
they may arise.
211
  THQ appealed to the Court’s past precedence of consolidating interrelated
bankruptcies between parent and subsidiaries,
212
 as well as notions of efficiency for both debtor
and court, to save time, expense, and energy in duplicating efforts with respect to notices, 
motions, and orders among the many parties.
213
  Further, THQ argued, no party would be
prejudiced or negatively affected by the joint administration of the case, noting that THQ’s 
creditors’ rights to the respective estates of each consolidated party would not be substantively 
affected.
214
  Accordingly, the Court granted such requested relief.
215
THQ’s Motion for Order to Maintain Accounts 
208 See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C.L. REV. 129, 129-30 
(2005).
209 See, e.g., In re Digital Domain Media Group, Inc., Case No. 12-12569 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 12, 2012); 
In re Pemco World Air Servs., Inc., Case No. 12-10799 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 3, 2012); In re Friendly Ice 
Cream Corp., Case No. 12-10799 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 6, 2011); In re Neb. Book Co., Case No. 11-12005 
(Bankr. Del. Jun. 28, 2011); In re Ambassadors Int’l, Inc., Case No. 11-11022 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 5, 
2011); In re Am. Safety Razor Co., Case No. 10-12351 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 23, 2010); In re Cooper-
Standard Holdings, Inc. Case No. 09-12743 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 5, 2009).
210 11 U.S.C. § 1015(b); Del. Bankr. Local Rule 1015-1.
211 Motion for Joint Administration Paragraph 4.
212 See, e.g., In re Digital Doman Media Grp., Inc. Case No. 12-12568 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 9, 2012); In 
re Pemco World Air Servs., Inc., Case No. 12-10799 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 6, 2012); In re Buffets Rests. 
Holdings, Inc., Case No. 12-10237 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 19, 2012); In re AES E. Energy, L.P., Case No. 
11-14138 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 4, 2012); In re DSI Holdings, Inc., Case No. 11-11941 (Bankr. D. Del. Jun. 
28, 2011); In re Elec. Components Int’l, Inc., Case No. 10-11054 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 22, 2009).
213 Motion for Joint Administration Paragraph 9-10.
214 Motion for Joint Administration Paragraph 11.
215 Order Approving THQ’s Motion for Joint Administration.
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THQ, as an ongoing concern, also sought to maintain its bank accounts and other related 
operational systems, specifically, the continued use of its cash management system, continued 
use of its existing business forms, the continued performance of intercompany transactions, and 
limited waivers for deposit and investment requirements under Section 345(b) of the Code.
216
As a mainstay of its business operations,
217
 THQ utilized an integrated cash management
system for the collection, management, and disbursement of funds.  THQ used the system to 
create status reports on the location and amount of funds; track and control corporate funds; 
ensure cash availability; initiate prompt payment of corporate, employee, and vendor related 
expenses; reduce administrative costs; and move funds throughout the organization structure.
218
Moreover, THQ used the cash management system to disburse funds via debit transactions, wire 
transfers, automated clearing house transfers, and tangible checks.
219
THQ’s cash management system was made up of numerous accounts at various financial 
institutions, including Union Bank, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JP Morgan), and UBS 
Financial Services, Inc. (UBS).
220
  For over fourteen years, THQ maintained accounts with
Union Bank.
221
  The Union Bank accounts were principally used for depository and
disbursement purposes, making them the primary bank accounts for the cash management 
system.
222
  Another integral part of THQ’s cash management system was its investment function,
including money market accounts with Union Bank, UBS, and JP Morgan.
223
216 Motion to Maintain Accounts.
217 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 59.
218 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 55.
219 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 57.
220 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 57.
221 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 59.
222 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 58(a), 102 (the key functions of the accounts were to collect 
cash receipts (Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 58(a)(1)); disburse funds for employee payroll 
(Motion to Maintain Accounts Paragraph 9(c)); satisfy vendor invoices (Motion to Maintain Accounts 
Paragraph 9(c)(1)); maintain spending accounts (Motion to Maintain Accounts Paragraph 9(c)(3)); and to 
transfer funds between THQ and its subsidiaries (Motion to Maintain Accounts Paragraph 9(c)(4); 
Motion to Maintain Accounts Paragraph 14).
223 Declaration of Brian Farrell Paragraph 58(d); Motion to Maintain Accounts Paragraph 9(d)(1); Motion 
to Maintain Accounts Paragraph 9(d)(2).
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Thus, to preserve its going-concern value, THQ would need access to its cash 
management system and related bank accounts, as it did prepetition, to continue with its day-to-
day operations and ongoing financial obligations.  THQ asserted in its motion that it was “vital . . 
. [to] maintain their Cash Management System . . . .” as “integral to the Debtor’s business 
operations . . .” the disruption of which “jeopardizes the Debtor’s ability to continue operating 
long enough to complete a sale as a going concern and seamlessly pay employees . . . .”  To 
freeze the cash management system and related bank accounts would cause an immediate halt to 
THQ’s ability to effectively operate.  The Court agreed and granted THQ’s motion.224
THQ’s Motion to Pay Critical Vendors 
THQ also filed a motion to pay the claims of its critical vendors, arguing that its business 
required that it purchase certain goods and services from third-party vendors, namely videogame 
developers hired as contractors and other related professionals.
225
  Without continued payment to
these vendors, THQ argued, it could not properly operate.
226
  To be considered “critical,” THQ
submitted that a vendor must be either a vendor providing “unique and specific engineered goods 
or services crucial to the continued operation of THQ, or provide essential goods and services, 
for which replacement with alternative vendors would be prohibitively expensive due to lead 
time required by alternate vendors or alternative vendors’ remote geographic location.”227  In
short, the very type of highly-skilled, rare, and expensive professionals used by THQ and other 
top videogame makers to develop, market, and sell its big titles. 
In its motion, THQ identified certain vendors to its business considered critical.
228
  Those
vendors included: 
 Product development vendors and service providers:  THQ hired many external
videogame developers, programming specialists, animators, visual designers, audio
production (voice talent, music, etc.).
229
224 Order Approving THQ’s Motion to Maintain Accounts.  
225 Motion to Pay Critical Trade Vendors. 
226 Motion to Pay Critical Trade Vendors Paragraph 6.  
227 Motion to Pay Critical Trade Vendors Paragraph 7.  
228 Motion to Pay Critical Trade Vendors Paragraph 8.  
229 Motion to Pay Critical Trade Vendors Paragraph 9-10. 
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 Operational vendors and service providers:  THQ entered into license agreements with
the various platform developers (e.g., Nintendo (Wii), Sony Computer Entertainment
(Playstation), and Microsoft (Xbox)) to develop games that play on each platform; hired
replicators (to digitally encode the games onto discs, assemble finished goods, and ship to
retail customers and distribution centers); and used other third-party vendors to provide
raw materials for game packaging and marketing displays.
230
 Marketing and Advertising service providers:  THQ relied on third-party marketing
vendors to promote its games prior to their release, to create and maintain corporate and
brand-specific websites, and to create and maintain its social media presence (Facebook,
Twitter, etc.); it also relied on creators of promotional videos and trailers to market its
videogames.
231
THQ estimated the cost due to its critical vendors was approximately $6 million, accounting for 
both pre- and postpetition claims.
232
THQ requested that the Court permit it to pay, at its discretion, the claims of any 
identified critical vendor to continue its business operations and maintain value in the 
company.
233
  The Court granted this motion.
234
THQ’s Motion to Pay Employee Benefits 
THQ next sought to continue payments for its employees,
235
 which included the authority
to pay the wages, salaries, other compensation, and taxes related to employee expenses 
(including salaried, hourly, and temporary employees, as well as independent contractors);
236
 pay
230 Motion to Pay Critical Trade Vendors Paragraph 11-12.
231 Motion to Pay Critical Trade Vendors Paragraph 13-15.
232 Motion to Pay Critical Trade Vendors Paragraph 17.
233 Motion to Pay Critical Trade Vendors Paragraph 20, 22; see also 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); see, e.g., In re 
TC12 Holdings, LLC 428 B.R. 117 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010); In re NVR L.P. 147 B.R. 126 (E.D. Va. 1992); 
In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc. 98 B.R. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). Accord Code Section 363(b)(1); see, 
e.g., Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors of LTV Aerospace & Def. Co. v. LTV Co. (In re 
Chateaugay Corp.), 973 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 100 B.R. 670 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1989).
234 Order Approving THQ’s Motion to Pay Critical Trade Vendors.
235 Motion to Pay Employee Benefits Paragraph 7.
236 Motion to Pay Employee Benefits Paragraph 12-21 (Also related to THQ’s cash management system, 
because such compensation was automatically deposited to employees and contractors).
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and honor both pre- and postpetition obligations relating to employee medical, insurance, sales 
bonus, and other benefit programs;
237
 and honor and process checks related to those
obligations.
238
THQ argued, successfully, that cause existed for the continued ability to pay 
compensation, benefits, and reimbursement for its employees.
239
  THQ asserted that its
employees relied on such compensation for daily living expenses, health, and well-being.
240
Additionally, and important for THQ’s continued corporate existence, immediate termination of 
certain employees would result in the hemorrhaging of “unique” operational, management, and 
development talent, further hindering THQ’s ability to preserve going-concern value and creditor 
confidence.
241
  Lastly, THQ relied on certain statutory authority to compel the Court to grant its
motion.
242
  The Court granted the motion.
243
THQ’s Motion to Honor Prepetition Obligations under Customer Marketing Programs 
Lastly,
244
 THQ sought to continue honoring its prepetition obligations under its customer
marketing programs, including those related to mass merchandisers, consumer electronic stores, 
237 Motion to Pay Employee Benefits Paragraph 22-59 (As previously discussed, some of THQ’s 
programs included sales incentive bonus plan (yearly and quarterly benchmarks); product development 
profit sharing bonus plan (profitability thresholds for subsidiary development companies); employee 
benefit programs (prescription and medical benefits, dental care, vision care, basic life insurance, 
disability insurance, vacation and PTO plans, 401(k) plans)).
238 Motion to Pay Employee Benefits Paragraph 22-59.
239 Order Approving THQ’s Motion to Pay Employee Benefits.
240 Motion to Pay Employee Benefits Paragraph 70.
241 Motion to Pay Employee Benefits Paragraph 64.
242 Motion to Pay Employee Benefits Paragraph 65-80; see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(B) (2012) 
(requiring payment of allowed unsecured claims for wages, salaries, and commissions); § 507(a)(4)(A) 
(granting priority treatment to employee claims for wages, salaries, or commissions for up to $11,725); § 
541 (requiring employer withholding and payment to governmental and taxing authorities); § 363(a) 
(permitting a debtor to pay prepetition obligations where a sound business purpose exists); §§ 1107(a), 
1108 (permitting DIP to operate the business for the benefit of creditors and equity owners and preserve 
going-concern value, see also In re CoServe, LLC, 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) establishing 
DIP’s fiduciary duties to protect and preserve estate); Section 105(a) (the doctrine of necessity).
243 Order Approving THQ’s Motion to Pay Employee Benefits.
244 THQ submitted additional first-day motions, but for the sake of brevity, this case study addresses only 
those identified herein.
38 
discount warehouses, and other national retail stores.
245
  THQ engaged in these programs to drive
sales, develop and maintain a positive reputation in the videogame and consumer industries, 
build customer loyalty, ensure customer satisfaction, meet competitive pressures,
246
 and generate
goodwill for its brand.
247
  Moreover, such programs remain customary in the industry, and
THQ’s customers would expect (and rely) on such programs in the course of business.248  Some
examples highlighted by THQ in its motion included: 
 Price protection credits:  THQ provided a credit to retailers who had purchased THQ’s
products at a higher price than later could be sold for as a result of decreased consumer
demand.
249
 Cooperative advertising with retailers:  THQ and retailers cooperated to promote and
advertise THQ’s upcoming and recently released videogames, and in consideration, THQ
credited retailers’ invoices.250
 Back-end rebates:  Retailers would sell THQ products at a reduced price for a short
promotional period and THQ would fund the amount of the discount, which would be
credited to the retailer after the product was actually purchased.
251
 Defective product credits:  THQ accounted for the possibility that its product would be
defective, which cost ordinarily would be borne by the retailer.  In consideration, THQ
provided a small credit to retailers.
252
 Freight rebates:  THQ reimbursed retailers for the cost of common carriers delivering its
product.
253
245 Motion to Honor Prepetition Obligations under Customer Marketing Programs.
246 This point truly cannot be overstated. THQ, as a player in the AAA world of videogame development 
(and one who was struggling, as discussed throughout this case study) could not afford to give less than 
other (better) companies.
247 Motion to Honor Prepetition Obligations under Customer Marketing Programs Paragraph 5.
248 Motion to Honor Prepetition Obligations under Customer Marketing Programs Paragraph 6.
249 Motion to Honor Prepetition Obligations under Customer Marketing Programs Paragraphs 7-8.
250 Motion to Honor Prepetition Obligations under Customer Marketing Programs Paragraph 9-10.
251 Motion to Honor Prepetition Obligations under Customer Marketing Programs Paragraphs 11-12.
252 Motion to Honor Prepetition Obligations under Customer Marketing Programs Paragraphs 13-14.
253 Motion to Honor Prepetition Obligations under Customer Marketing Programs Paragraph 15.
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 Miscellaneous rebates and credits:  THQ also offered certain discounts and credits to
customers who, for example, wanted to trade out games that were at different price
points.
254
Arguing that these obligations were standard for the industry and necessary to maintain
good retailer and customer relations, THQ asserted it must maintain its prepetition customer 
programs.
255
  One major point that THQ made was that without the credits, retailers and
customers would instead turn to the company’s major competitors, like EA, Ubisoft, or 
Activision, to get (essentially) the same product accompanied by more favorable programs.
256
The Court accepted THQ’s argument and granted its motion.257
Objections to the Sale 
On January 2, 2013, just days after THQ asked the Court to allow the sale of the entire 
company to Clearlake Capital, several interested parties filed objections to the proposed 363 sale. 
The first and most important group that objected to the sale was the Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”).258  The Committee was comprised of a collection of
note holders who together held roughly $100 million in unsecured convertible notes, as well as 
three of the largest trade creditors.
259
  The Committee’s reason for opposing the sale is
unsurprising; they stood to lose essentially everything in the sale plan.  According to the terms of 
the proposed sale, nearly all of the roughly $60 million purchase price by Clearlake would be 
254 Motion to Honor Prepetition Obligations under Customer Marketing Programs Paragraph 16.
255 Motion to Honor Prepetition Obligations under Customer Marketing Programs Paragraph 27.
256 Motion to Honor Prepetition Obligations under Customer Marketing Programs Paragraph 27.
257 Order Approving THQ’s Motion to Honor Prepetition Obligations under Customer Marketing 
Programs.
258 Based on the expedited sale date requested in the motion, the note holders felt it best to form an 
immediate ad hoc group of 3 of the convertible note holders in order to promptly object to the sale. These 
three note holders, Silverback Asset Management, Third Avenue Focused Credit Fund, and Wolverine 
Flagship Fund, collectively held 41% of the principal amount of the convertible notes. Eventually, when 
the full collection of note holders could successfully form the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors 
(the “Committee”), they would issue a separate objection on behalf of the Committee. The Committee, 
made up of the holders of the convertible notes and certain other trade creditors, was eventually formed 
on January 3, 2013. They filed their own objection to the sale on January 3, 2013, which was a verbatim 
copy of the objection filed by the Ad Hoc Committee of Convertible Noteholders.
259 Members of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. The committee was formed on January 3, 
2012 and was represented by Landis Rath & Cobb LLP and Andrews Kurth LLP.
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used to pay off Wells Fargo, first paying its large secured claim and then paying the DIP credit 
facility.
260
  The only consideration paid to the Committee would be a $10 million unsecured note
executed by Clearlake with a maturation date of 2020 and an interest rate of only 2%.
261
  Under
this plan, the Committee would receive an estimated 1-3% of their unsecured claim.
262
  Needless
to say, the Committee was not happy with the proposed sale. 
The United States Trustee for the region also raised an objection to the proposed sale. 
The Office of the U.S. Trustee is a division of the Department of Justice tasked with oversight of 
the national bankruptcy system.
263
  The office dispatches officers, known as United States
Trustees, to investigate potential fraud and abuse in bankruptcy cases.
264
  Because bankruptcy is
designed to effectuate an orderly distribution of assets to a debtor’s creditors, a U.S. Trustee will 
generally object when he feels that, due to an insider relationship, a debtor is taking a particular 
action to the detriment of his unsecured creditors.
265
  Because of this responsibility to protect the
interests of unsecured creditors, the U.S. Trustee often has the same interests as the Committee 
and will object when he feels their rights are threatened. 
While sales under Section 363 generally do not provide the unsecured creditors with 
much of a return on their claim, the sales must nonetheless be fair and equitable to all parties 
involved.
266
  However, this sale, according to the Committee and the U.S. Trustee, was anything
but fair and equitable.
267
 In its objection, the U.S. Trustee focused on the expedited timing and
the allegedly excessive breakup fee required by the Asset Purchase Agreement in the debtor’s 
363 sale motion.
268
  The Committee similarly objected to the expedited timing, but focused the
bulk of their objection on the non-piecemeal bidding process required under the sale motion. 
260 Objection by the Ad Hoc Committee of Convertible Noteholders Paragraph 2; Objection by the 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Paragraph 2.
261 Objection by the Ad Hoc Committee of Convertible Noteholders Paragraph 20; Objection by the 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Paragraph 20.
262 Objection by the Ad Hoc Committee of Convertible Noteholders Paragraph 20; Objection by the 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Paragraph 20.
263 George W. Kuney et al., CHAPTER 11-101: THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF CHAPTER 11 PRACTICE: A 
PRIMER 20 (2007).
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 232.
267 Objection by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors; Objection by the United States Trustee.
268 Objection by the United States Trustee.
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Objection to the Expedited Timing 
The Committee and the U.S. Trustee each objected to the expedited timeline for the 
proposed sale, alleging that it would chill competitive bidding and thus unfairly hurt the 
unsecured creditors.
269
  THQ filed its motion requesting the going-concern sale on December 19,
2012. Pursuant to the initially submitted APA, prospective bidders were required to submit bids 
by January 8, 2013 with an auction to take place on January 9, 2013, and a final sale hearing on 
January 10, 2013.
270
  However, the Court did not set the hearing date for approval of the sale,
including the bidding procedures, until January 4, 2013.
271
  Thus, once all prospective bidders
knew the rules of the auction, they would have only four days to perform sufficient due diligence 
to determine if they wanted to bid.
272
  Furthermore, because the timing fell within the holiday
season, the Committee alleged that any potential bidders would likely be unavailable and thus 
fail to submit a bid.
273
  This deadline, according to the Committee and the U.S. Trustee, would
prevent competitive bidding and assure that Clearlake would be the ultimate purchaser under the 
terms of the APA, much to the detriment of the unsecured creditors, and thus, it was unfair and 
unreasonable.
274
Objection to the Breakup Fee 
The U.S. Trustee next targeted the proposed breakup fee in the sale motion.
275
  In a
typical chapter 11 sale of assets outside the ordinary course of business, the stalking horse bidder 
submits the initial bid to set the floor for other bidders.  Accordingly, the stalking horse bidder 
performs a substantial amount of due diligence to discover the value of the assets, or, as in this 
case the value of the entire company, before submitting its initial bid.  Other bidders, however, 
can avoid much of this cost by simply relying on the due diligence of the stalking horse bidder.  
Courts have recognized the disadvantageous position of the stalking horse bidder, and so to 
protect it, they allow it to require in its asset purchase agreement that, if it is not ultimately the 
269 Objection by the United States Trustee, Objection by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
270 Objection by the United States Trustee Paragraph 7; Objection by the Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors Paragraph 29.
271 Objection by the United States Trustee Paragraph 7.
272 Objection by the United States Trustee; Objection by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
273 Objection by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Paragraph 30.
274 Objection by the United States Trustee; Objection by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
275 Objection by the United States Trustee.
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winner at the auction, the winner must pay it a “breakup fee.”276  Courts will additionally allow
the stalking horse bidder to set a minimum overbid requirement so long as the amount is not 
unfair or unreasonable.
277
In THQ’s proposed sale to Clearlake, the asset purchase agreement included a breakup 
fee of $1.75 million and a $50,000 expense reimbursement.
278
  Thus, assuming Clearlake was not
the winning bidder, the winner would have to pay Clearlake $2.25 million in addition to their bid 
amount.
279
  THQ asserted that a 1-3% breakup fee is appropriate in sales of assets under Section
363(f).
280
  To comply with this standard, THQ alleged that the fee should be measured against
the total amount of consideration to be paid by Clearlake under the APA. Here, Clearlake was to 
pay a total of roughly $60 million.  Thus, as a percentage of the total purchase price, Clearlake’s 
requested breakup fee was less than 3% and therefore reasonable. 
The U.S. Trustee disagreed with the calculation used by THQ in its sale motion.
281
Rather than using the total consideration offered in the sale motion, the U.S. Trustee argued that 
the breakup fee must be measured against only the cash component of the sale.
282
  By using the
cash component, $29 million to satisfy the DIP credit facility and $6.65 million in additional 
cash, the breakup fee totaled over 6% of the cash component and was therefore unreasonable. 
Objection to the Non-Piecemeal Sale 
While the Committee objected to several features of the proposed sale under the initial 
APA, its strongest objection focused on the debtor’s requirement that the auction only allow bids 
for the entire company.  Under the proposed sale to Clearlake, competing bidders had to submit 
“qualified bids” for the bid to be considered.  According to the APA, a qualified bid required a 
276 Kuney, supra note 263, at 231.
277 Id. at 425.
278 THQ’s Motion for the Sale of Substantially All of its Assets Paragraph 51.
279 THQ’s Motion for the Sale of Substantially All of its Assets Paragraph 51.
280 THQ’s Motion for the Sale of Substantially All of its Assets Paragraph 102.
281 Objection by the United States Trustee.
282 Objection by the United States Trustee Paragraph 11 (citing Calpine Corp. v. O’Brien Envtl. Energy, 
Inc. (In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc.), 181 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1999) (The amount of the bid protections 
is excessive when measured against the cash component of the purchase price and does not represent the 
“actual, necessary” cost of preserving the Debtors’ estate.)).
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competing bidder to bid for all of THQ’s assets; it could not bid for one or several properties 
without taking the whole lot.
283
This outcome was certainly preferable to THQ.  If a buyer had to purchase THQ in its 
entirety, it would likely wish to rehire the current THQ management and employees to continue 
operations.  By wiping out the liability owed to the note holders, THQ believed that it could 
regain profitability with relatively few changes to its organizational structure and its relationships 
with its customers and vendors.
284
THQ made this goal clear in a press release posted on its website on December 19, 2012, 
the same day it filed chapter 11.
285
  In this release, Rubin explained that Clearlake would
purchase all of THQ through a chapter 11 bankruptcy.
286
  He reassured the public at large that
the bankruptcy did not mean the end of THQ, as Clearlake would purchase the entire company 
and will fund the production of all titles currently in development. Specifically, he states, “Rest 
assured that the goal throughout this sale process has been to preserve our teams and products . . 
. .  Whatever happens, the teams and products look likely to end up together and in good hands.” 
By structuring the APA’s bid procedures in such a way that a potential buyer could not bid 
unless it agreed to purchase all of THQ’s assets, THQ could more easily resume operations 
without substantial changes to its management. 
While this may have been great for THQ, it was not the best option for the unsecured 
creditors.  THQ was the sole owner of several different studios, each tasked with producing one 
or more game franchises.  Each of these studios produced a different type of game.  For example, 
Relic was established solely for the creation of Company of Heroes, a military-strategy game set 
283 Proposed Bidding Procedures for the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets. (“Each Bid must 
provide for the purchase of all or a substantial portion of the Assets and payment or assumption of all or a 
substantial portion of the liabilities to be paid or assumed under the Stalking Horse Agreement”).
284 This was, in fact, specifically the goal of the sale to Clearlake. The Committee alleged that THQ had 
engineered the entire sale process to Clearlake to ensure that the key employees and management could 
retain their jobs, yet had made scant reference to this arrangement in their sale motion. Pursuant to Local 
Rule 6004, the debtor must include this information in the Bidding Procedures Motion. The Committee 
alleged that, by failing to disclose this information, THQ was not only in violation of the Local Rules, but 
also failing to act in the best interest of creditors. As a result, it requested that the sale not be approved as 
constructed in the debtors’ motion.
285 THQ Community Message From Jason Rubin, THQ INVESTOR RELATIONS (Dec. 19, 2012), http://
www.thq.com/us/go/article/view/homepage_article/261277/thq_community_message_from_jason_ rubin 
(last visited April 23, 2013).
286 THQ Community Message From Jason Rubin, THQ INVESTOR RELATIONS (Dec. 19, 2012), http://
www.thq.com/us/go/article/view/homepage_article/261277/thq_community_message_from_jason_ rubin 
(last visited April 23, 2013).
44 
during World War II.  This contrasted with another other development subsidiary, Volition, 
which exclusively developed the Saints Row franchise, an action game about gang conflict.  
These two studios make completely different types of games.  According to the Committee, a 
piecemeal sale of each studio would enable other developers to strategically pick certain game 
studios instead of being forced to purchase all of them in a going concern sale.
287
  This piecemeal
sale approach would, according to the Committee, yield a much higher auction result than a 
forced going concern sale.
288
The Committee’s argument was logical.  The likely purchasers of the several studios 
would be other large videogame developers.  After all, the games made by each THQ subsidiary 
studio had an established fan base with several obtaining critical acclaim.  A studio without a 
similar title would certainly be interested in bidding on the subsidiary.  However, if a studio had 
a similar title to just one of THQ’s many games, and yet it had to bid for all of THQ’s assets in 
the auction, it would necessarily own duplicative titles if it won the auction.  This result would 
alone discourage competitive bidding.  For example, a studio may wish to add Saints Row to its 
collection of properties, but if it already develops its own military strategy game, it will not want 
to also purchase Company of Heroes.  The requirement that all bidders bid for the entire 
company would certainly chill bidding to the detriment of the unsecured creditors. 
Court Approves the Auction, But Not Before Making Certain Modifications to the Bidding 
Procedures 
On January 11, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court approved THQ’s motion for a sale of its 
assets under Section 363 of the Code.
289
  However, acknowledging the concerns of the United
States Trustee and the Committee in their respective objections, it made certain changes to the 
proposed order.  
First, the Court addressed the disputed bidding procedures.
290
  Recognizing the high
breakup fee relative to the sale’s cash component, the Court ordered that the fee be lowered from 
$1.75 million to $1 million.
291
  This adjustment lowered the ratio of the breakup fee to the cash
component to 2-3%, which was, according to the Court, a more fair and reasonable amount. 
287 Objection by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Paragraph 32.
288 Objection by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Paragraph 32.
289 Order Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets.
290 Order Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets Paragraph A; Bidding Procedures 
for the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets.
291 Order Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor's Assets Paragraph B.
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Next, the Court adjusted the sale date. Both the United States Trustee and the Committee 
had objected to the expedited time for the sale, which was to occur only four days after the 
hearing on the bidding procedures motion.
292
  Recognizing the need for a quick sale, but still
wanting to provide potential bidders with adequate time to conduct the required due diligence, 
the Court ordered that the sale hearing would be pushed to January 23, 2013.
293
  On this date, the
Court would award all of the assets to the stalking horse bidder, Clearlake, or any higher bidding 
party at the auction.
294
  Any party who objected to the sale would be required to file their
objection on January 18, and any reply by THQ would be due on January 21.
295
  Finally, the
Court set the deadline for bidding on January 22 at 9:30 a.m. with the auction to actually take 
place later that afternoon at 3:00 p.m.
296
  However, if THQ did not receive any bids other than
Clearlake’s stalking horse bid, the Court would not hold an auction; Clearlake would simply take 
the assets at their bid price.
297
Finally, much to the dismay of Clearlake and THQ, the Court adjusted the bidding 
procedures to allow piecemeal bidding.
298
  In THQ’s sale motion, the initial APA defined a
“Qualified Bid” as one that included a bid for all or substantially all the assets.299  Thus, pursuant
to their requested sale procedures, only buyers of the entire company could actually bid at the 
auction.
300
  However, in the bidding procedures, attached as Exhibit 1 to the sale order, the Court
defines a “Qualified Bidder” as one who bids for either “all or substantially all of the Debtors’ 
Assets or any part of the Debtors’ Assets (a ‘Piecemeal Bid’).”301  The order further explains that
if the Debtors receive Piecemeal Bids from Qualified Bidders, and such bids, in the aggregate, 
292 See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
293 Order Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets Paragraph 3.
294 Order Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets Paragraph 3.
295 Order Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets Paragraph 4.
296 Order Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets Paragraph 6.
297 Order Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets Paragraph 9.
298 Bidding Procedures for the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets.
299 THQ’s Motion for the Sale of Substantially All of its Assets.
300 THQ’s Motion for the Sale of Substantially All of its Assets.
301 Bidding Procedures for the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets.
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would result in greater value to the estate than under Clearlake’s stalking horse bid, the assets 
shall be sold to the various Piecemeal Bidders.
302
The Auction Concludes 
Pursuant to the sale order, the auction for the sale of substantially all of THQ’s assets 
occurred on January 22 and 23, 2013.
303
  However, because of the Court’s allowance of
piecemeal bidding for the assets, Clearlake was not the final purchaser.  Instead, confirming the 
belief held by the Committee in its objection, the piecemeal sale encouraged diverse bidding 
from competing studios, leading to an aggregate sale price in excess of Clearlake’s Stalking 
Horse Bid.
304
  The results of the auction were as follows:
305
1. Relic, whose assets were held primarily for the marketing, development, and sale of the
Company of Heroes franchise, sold to Sega Corporation for $26.6 million.
306
2. THQ Montreal, whose assets were held primarily for the marketing, development, and
sale of the 1666 and Underdog franchises, sold to Ubisoft LLC for $2.5 million.
307
3. The assets held primarily for the marketing, development, and sale of Evolve sold to
Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. for approximately $10.9 million.
308
302 Bidding Procedures for the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets.
303 Notice of Auction Results.
304 Notice of Auction Results.
305 Notice of Auction Results Exhibit A: THQ, Inc., et al. Auction Summary: January 22-23, 2013.
306 COMPANY OF HEROES, http://www.relic.com/games/company-of-heroes/ (last visited April 8, 2013) 
(Company of Heroes is a “real-time strategy” game set in World War II Europe. While the original game 
was released over six years ago, Relic was engaged in the development of Company of Heroes 2 when it 
sold its assets to Sega. Sega’s expected release date of Company of Heroes 2 is June 25, 2013). 
307 Christopher Dring, Ubisoft acquires new THQ Montreal IP 1666, DEVELOP-ONLINE (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.develop-online.net/news/43064/Ubisoft-acquires-new-THQ-Montreal-IP-1666 (last visited 
April 23, 2013) (Little is known about the 1666 game, but industry insiders speculate that the game will 
be a historical action game focused on the Great Fire of London, which occurred in 1666). 
308 Jeffrey Grubb, Turtle Rock Studios outbid for its own game: Take 2 thinks it’s worth $11M, 
VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 23, 2013, 1:13PM), http://venturebeat.com/2013/01/23/thq-auction-turtle-rock-
evolve-11-million/ (last visited April 23, 2013) (Like 1666, nothing is known about Evolve, as it was in 
the beginning stages of development when Take-Two purchased it at the auction. According to industry 
authors, based on Take-Two’s history of spending large sums of money to develop games as well as the 
over $10 million purchase price, Evolve should command high sales forecasts). 
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4. Volition, whose assets were held primarily for the marketing, development, and sale of
the Saints Row franchise, sold to Koch Media GmbH for in excess of $22 million.
309
5. The assets held primarily for the marketing, development, and sale of the Homefront
franchise sold to Crytek GmbH for $544,218.
310
6. The assets held primarily for the marketing, development, and sale of Metro 2033 and
Metro 2034 sold to Koch Media GmbH for over $5. 8 million.
311
7. The assets held primarily for the marketing, development, and sale of South Park: The
Stick of Truth sold to Ubisoft LLC for over $3.2 million.
312
Two other studios, Vigil and THQ Agoura Hills, were not sold in the auction.
313
Just like that, THQ’s dreams of a going concern sale, complete with protections for 
management and development teams, were gone.  Instead of THQ simply ridding itself of the 
debt held by the unsecured note holders and continuing operations, it sold its assets to 
competitors, costing management and certain employees their jobs. 
While Jason Rubin had expressed his belief that THQ would remain intact following the 
sale in his press release,
314
 he was forced to tell his employees the hard truth in a letter that
309 SAINT’S ROW, http://www.saintsrow.com/ (last visited April 8, 2013) (Saints Row is an open-world-
action-adventure game focused around gang activity in a fictional city. Koch Media, the purchaser of the 
assets used to develop Saints Row, plans to release the fourth installment of the game through its 
subsidiary, Deep Silver, on August 20, 2013).
310 HOMEFRONT, http://www.ign.com/games/homefront-2/pc-118311 (last visited April 8, 2013)
(Homefront is a first-person shooter game focused on a fictional invasion of the United States by North 
Korea. Following its purchase of the Homefront assets, Crytek is expected to release a sequel, Homefront 
2, sometime in 2013).
311 METRO, http://www.ign.com/games/metro-last-light/pc-79464 (last visited April 23, 2013) (The Metro 
series is a futuristic, post-apocalyptic first-person shooter game. Koch Media, the purchaser of the Metro 
assets, expects to release Metro: Last Light through its subsidiary, Deep Silver, on May 14, 2013).
312 SOUTH PARK: THE STICK OF TRUTH, http://www.ign.com/games/south-park-the-game/ps3-123757 
(last visited April 23, 2013) (South Park: The Stick of Truth is a role playing game set in the fictional 
South Park universe. Its purchaser in the auction, Ubisoft LLC, expects to release the game sometime in 
2013).
313 Notice of Auction Results; THQ’s Motion to Allow a Settlement with the Terminated Employees.
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followed the sale.
315
  Specifically, when explaining the employment situation to his former
employees, Mr. Rubin stated:  “[W]e cannot say what these owners may intend, and there will 
likely be some positions that will not be needed under the new ownership. . . .  If you are an 
employee of an entity that is not included in the sale, we regret to inform you that your position 
will end.”316
This result, unfortunate as it may be for THQ’s management and employees, reflects the 
underlying purpose of asset sales under Section 363:  to maximize the value of the bankruptcy 
estate for the benefit of the creditors.  By permitting a piecemeal sale, the estate amassed $12 
million more than it would have under the Stalking Horse Bid, allowing a higher yield to the 
unsecured note holders.
317
Post-Auction Events 
Assumption and Assignment of the Related Executory Contracts 
Following the sale, each purchaser listed the contract rights related to its purchase that it 
wished to acquire as was required under the sale order.
318
  This process of buying and selling
rights to executory contracts is a standard practice under the Bankruptcy Code, whether the 
debtor is reorganizing or selling its assets.
319
  A debtor first decides if it wants to reject or assume
each of its executory contracts.  If a debtor rejects a contract, any damages suffered by the non-
debtor as a result of the rejection shall be treated as a prepetition unsecured claim.
320
  However,
if the contract is valuable to the debtor, either for its own operations or for its market value, the 
314 THQ Community Message From Jason Rubin, THQ INVESTOR RELATIONS (Dec. 19, 2012), http://
www.thq.com/us/go/article/view/homepage_article/261277/thq_community_message_from_jason_rubin 
(last visited April 23, 2013).
315 Jason Schreier, THQ Is No More. Here’s The Letter The CEO Sent Employees Today, Kotaku (Jan. 23, 
2013, 3:06PM), http://kotaku.com/5978429/this-is-the-letter-that-thq-sent-to-employees-today (last 
visited April 23, 2013).
316 Jason Schreier, THQ Is No More. Here’s The Letter The CEO Sent Employees Today, Kotaku (Jan. 23, 
2013, 3:06PM), http://kotaku.com/5978429/this-is-the-letter-that-thq-sent-to-employees-today (last 
visited April 23, 2013).
317 Notice of Auction Results.
318 Order Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets Paragraph 14; Bidding 
Procedures for the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets.
319 11 U.S.C. § 365(f).
320 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
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debtor may assume the contract.
321
  This requires the debtor to cure any defaults, compensate the
non-debtor party for any pecuniary loss suffered from the defaults, and provide adequate 
assurances to the non-debtor party that it will not default again in the future.
322
  Once a debtor
successfully assumes a contract, it may, if it desires, assign the contract to any other party 
notwithstanding any “anti-assignment” provision in the underlying agreement, assuming the 
assignee also provides the non-debtor party with assurances of future compliance.
323
The assignment of executory contracts to the various buyers was an instrumental part of 
the asset sale under 363.  Under the revised APA in the Sale Order, which dictated the various 
THQ assets to be sold at the auction, each Qualified Bidder was required to identify which 
contracts that it wished to take via assignment as a part of its asset purchase.
324
  These contracts
were critical to each bidder’s asset acquisition, as many of the game studios relied upon certain 
software and intellectual property licenses to actually produce the games.  Thus, in order for each 
purchaser to successfully continue development of the games after their respective asset 
purchases, each purchaser listed each executory contract that it wanted to assume.  This would 
allow THQ to properly assume and assign each relevant contract to each buyer. 
This process was not uncontested, however. Prior to the sale, THQ filed and distributed a 
notice of all of its executory contracts to each of the non-debtor parties to each contract.
325
  This
notice contained the estimated cure amount for each contract in anticipation of the contracts’ 
assumption and assignment to the ultimate purchaser of the THQ assets.  Finding this estimated 
cure amount insufficient, several of the non-debtor parties filed objections to the assignment of 
their contracts.
326
  Specifically, they alleged that THQ failed to provide a sufficient payment to
cure the defaults under the contract and failed to provide adequate assurances of future 
compliance, both prerequisites to assumption under Section 365.
327
321 11 U.S.C. § 365(f).
322 11 U.S.C. § 365(b).
323 11 U.S.C. § 365(f).
324 Order Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets Paragraph 14, Section b.
325 Notice of Auction Results.
326 Objection and Reservation of Rights of Pipeworks Software (Each of the other non-debtor parties to 
THQ’s executory contracts filed nearly identical objections).
327 THQ’s Response to the Objections of the Non-Debtor Parties to the Executory Contracts (Pursuant to 
11 U.S.C. § 365(b), all contracts to be assigned must first be assumed, and to assume a contract, the 
debtor must cure all defaults under the contract.).
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In response, because each objection was so similar, THQ filed one omnibus reply 
covering each objection.
328
  However, rather than explain why the estimated cure amount was
accurate, THQ instead simply stated either that the contract would not be assumed or that any 
dispute would be worked out before the sale, likely an insufficient answer for the non-debtor 
parties to the contracts.
329
The Court ultimately overruled the objections raised by the non-debtor parties.
330
  Each
of the Court’s sale orders to the respective asset purchasers included a section detailing the 
treatment of each contract that each buyer wished to purchase.  In these sections, the Court 
ordered that each contract be assigned so long as the purchaser paid the “Determined Cure Cost” 
as defined in the respective asset purchase agreements for each asset sale (the Auction Asset 
Purchase Agreements).
331
  Thus, pursuant to the respective sale order and the terms of each
Auction Asset Purchase Agreement, each purchaser simply picked which contracts it wanted as a 
part of its asset purchase, paid the required cure amount, and obtained rights to the contract, 
notwithstanding the objections of the non-debtor parties. 
In addition to the intellectual property contracts, THQ also had to deal with its real 
property leases.  THQ was no longer engaged in the business of videogame development, and 
most of its offices had been vacated.  Because the leases were generating unnecessary 
administrative expenses each month, THQ made the decision to reject its real property leases 
under Section 365(a), filing a motion requesting such relief on January 31, 2013.
332
  In its
motion, THQ indicated three large office space leases that it wished to reject:  its leased offices 
in Champaign, Illinois (the “Champaign Lease”), New York City (the “New York Lease”), and 
Huixquilucan, Mexico (the “Mexico Lease”).333  However, while THQ was able to reject the
328 THQ’s Response to the Objections of the Non-Debtor Parties to the Executory Contracts.
329 THQ’s Response to the Objections of the Non-Debtor Parties to the Executory Contracts.
330 Order Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets.
331 Asset Purchase Agreement for the Evolve Assets Section 2.5 (Each of the seven asset sales had a 
separate sale order and asset purchase agreement that provided for, among other things, the executory 
contracts to be assigned to each purchaser. The Asset Purchase Agreement for the Evolve Assets is 
substantially similar to the Asset Purchase Agreements for the other assets purchased in the sale).
332 THQ’s Motion to Reject Certain Unexpired Non-Residential Real Property Leases; THQ’s Second 
Motion to Reject Certain Unexpired Non-Residential Real Property Leases.
333 THQ’s Motion to Reject Certain Unexpired Non-Residential Real Property Leases; THQ’s Second 
Motion to Reject Certain Unexpired Non-Residential Real Property Leases.
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New York Lease and the Mexico Lease without issue,
334
 it ran into trouble with its attempted
rejection of the Champaign Lease.
335
The controversy around the Champaign Lease was due primarily to the presence of a 
subtenant who refused to leave the leased premises.
336
  The basic facts are as follows.  THQ
entered into the Champaign Lease with Church Street Square, LLC (CSS), the lessor, on 
November 16, 2007.
337
  This lease included a six and a half year term, beginning on January 1,
2008 and ending on May 31, 2014.
338
  On April 1, 2011, THQ subleased the Champaign Lease to
004 Technologies USA Inc. (004) following CSS’s written consent to the sublease as required by 
the Champaign Lease.
339
  As of the date of rejection by THQ, January 31, 2013, 004 had not
relinquished the leased property back to CSS; rather, it continued to occupy and conduct 
business on the premises.
340
The issue created by 004’s continued occupation is the treatment of the rental payments 
as a prepetition breach or an administrative expense.  Pursuant to Section 365, a rejected non-
residential real property lease shall be treated as a prepetition breach, entitling the lessor to a 
prepetition claim for the lost rent subject to certain limitations.
341
  However, until the lessee
properly rejects such lease, the lessor must continue to perform pursuant to the lease terms.  If 
the debtor lessee later rejects the lease, the lessor will be entitled to administrative expense 
priority for all expenses incurred between the petition date and the date of rejection.
342
  THQ
argued that the date of rejection should be January 31, 2013, the date it filed its motion to reject 
334 Order Authorizing Rejection of Certain Unexpired Non-Residential Real Property Leases.
335 Objection by Church Street Square, LLC to THQ’s Second Motion to Reject Certain Unexpired Non-
Residential Real Property Leases.
336 Objection by Church Street Square, LLC to THQ’s Second Motion to Reject Certain Unexpired Non-
Residential Real Property Leases.
337 Objection by Church Street Square, LLC to THQ’s Second Motion to Reject Certain Unexpired Non-
Residential Real Property Leases Paragraph 2.
338 Church Street Square, LLC Lease Section 3.
339 Objection by Church Street Square, LLC to THQ’s Second Motion to Reject Certain Unexpired Non-
Residential Real Property Leases Paragraph 4.
340 Objection by Church Street Square, LLC to THQ’s Second Motion to Reject Certain Unexpired Non-
Residential Real Property Leases Paragraph 8.
341 11 U.S.C. § 365(g), § 502(b)(6).
342 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).
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the Champaign Lease.
343
  CSS on the other hand contended that the date of rejection should be
the date that 004 vacated the leased premises, which was expected to be May 15, 2013, the date 
of termination on the sublease.
344
 Because THQ was liable for rent payments on the sublease,
345
CSS requested that all rent obligations due from the petition date to May 15, 2013 be treated as 
administrative expenses. 
The Court resolved the issue once and for all on February 19, 2013.
346
  Siding with THQ,
the Court determined that the date of rejection would be January 31, 2013, and CSS would not be 
entitled to any administrative expenses for unpaid rent after that date regardless of 004’s 
continued occupation of the leased premises.
347
  However, in consideration of the damages
suffered by CSS, the Court ordered THQ to pay CSS $22,400.
348
  Following this ruling, THQ
had properly rejected nearly all of its real property office leases.  It next turned its attention to 
wrapping up the rest of the loose ends remaining following the sale of its assets at the auction.  
The Closing of Vigil and THQ Agoura Hills 
While THQ successfully sold most of its valuable game development assets in the asset 
sale on January 22-23, 2013, it failed to sell two of its studios, Vigil and THQ Agoura Hills 
(Agoura Hills).
349
  With no buyer, it became clear to THQ that it would have to cease operations
at these studios.  Thus, as Jason Rubin warned in his letter to the employees following the sale of 
assets,
350
 certain employees would lose their jobs.  In total, the closing of the two studios caused
the termination of over 200 employees.
351
343 THQ’s Second Motion to Reject Certain Unexpired Non-Residential Real Property Leases.
344 Objection by Church Street Square, LLC to THQ’s Second Motion to Reject Certain Unexpired Non-
Residential Real Property Leases Paragraph 9.
345 Sublease Agreement Between THQ, Church Street Square, LLC, and 004 Technologies USA, Inc.
346 Order Authorizing Rejection of Certain Unexpired Non-Residential Real Property Leases.
347 Order Authorizing Rejection of Certain Unexpired Non-Residential Real Property Leases Paragraph 3.
348 Order Authorizing Rejection of Certain Unexpired Non-Residential Real Property Leases Paragraph 
11.
349 Notice of Sale of Substantially All of THQ's Assets; THQ’s Motion to Allow a Settlement with the 
Terminated Employees.
350 Jason Rubin Letter to Employees Following the Auction.
351 THQ’s Motion to Allow a Settlement with the Terminated Employees (noting that THQ had employed 
approximately 120 employees at Vigil and 88 employees at Agoura Hills).
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The termination of these employees concerned THQ and its attorneys for more than its 
impact on the lives of the now terminated workers.  Pursuant to the federal Worker Adjustment 
and Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act), certain employers are required to provide sixty-
days notice of any “mass layoff,” which is defined under the statute as a layoff affecting fifty or 
more employees during any thirty-day period.
352
  THQ failed to provide this notice to its
employees because it did not anticipate the closing of either Vigil or Agoura Hills.  If no 
competing bidder had outbid Clearlake’s Stalking Horse Bid, Clearlake intended to keep these 
studios operational, causing no job loss as a result of the sale.  However, because of the 
unexpected piecemeal sale, coupled with the lack of bids on Vigil and Agoura Hills, THQ found 
itself potentially in violation of federal law. 
The WARN Act’s sixty-day notice requirement has certain exceptions.  Under the Act, an 
employer may shut down a site of employment without providing the sixty-day notice if (1) at 
the time the notice would have been required, the employer was actively seeking capital which, 
if obtained, would prevent the need to close the site, and (2) the employer reasonably believed 
that giving the notice would have prevented the employer from obtaining the needed capital.
353
Because these studios would have remained open if Clearlake had been the successful bidder, 
THQ believed that it fell directly within this exception with regard to its decision to close Vigil 
and Agoura Hills.  
While THQ could have chosen to litigate this issue, incurring attorneys’ fees and court 
costs to be paid out of the bankruptcy estate, it preferred to settle with the terminated 
employees.
354
  Thus, on January 21, 2013, THQ filed a motion to allow it to enter into a
settlement agreement with the employees from Vigil and Agoura Hills.
355
  This settlement would
be offered to each employee individually, and would provide each employee with a cash 
payment representing thirty days of compensation and a cash payment of the value of the 
benefits that the employee would have received during that thirty-day period.
356
  In exchange, the
employee would agree to waive all claims based upon the WARN Act as well as any other 
potential claims under THQ’s severance policy.357  In addition, the employee would further agree
352 21 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109. THQ’s Motion to Allow a Settlement with the Terminated Employees.
353 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(1).
354 THQ’s Motion to Allow a Settlement with the Terminated Employees (Noting THQ’s probability of 
success; the complexity, expense, inconvenience, and delay of litigation involved; the benefit to creditors; 
and the expected difficulty of collection).
355 THQ’s Motion to Allow a Settlement with the Terminated Employees.
356 THQ’s Motion to Allow a Settlement with the Terminated Employees Paragraph 14, 15.
357 THQ’s Motion to Allow a Settlement with the Terminated Employees Paragraph 15.
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to preserve THQ confidentiality and refrain from making any disparaging comments about THQ, 
its Board of Directors, affiliates, subsidiaries, or any current or former employees.
358
  On
February 19, 2013, finding this settlement reasonable and in the best interest of the estate, the 
Court approved the settlement agreement, allowing THQ to avoid any uncertainty regarding 
liability from closing of Vigil and Agoura Hills.
359
The WWE Contract 
In its sale of substantially all of its assets, THQ also failed to sell one of its most well-
known and valuable properties, an exclusive license with WWE to produce an annual WWE 
game based around the wrestling league.
360
  Professional wrestling is an extraordinarily popular
sport in America, and the WWE is the most popular league; its weekly show, “Monday Night 
Raw,” has been watched by at least 4.2 million viewers per week in 2013.361  This popularity
extended into videogames, with THQ’s most recent WWE game, WWE 13, selling 250,000 
copies within one week of release.
362
The terms of the contract between THQ and WWE were relatively straightforward.  THQ 
was required to pay a $7.5 million annual advance to WWE each year through 2017.
363
  Each
advance was recoupable against the royalties earned throughout the year.
364
  To develop the
game, THQ employed approximately twenty employees.
365
  Additionally, it engaged a third-
party developer to help with the production of WWE 13 and WWE 14.
366
  This developer, Yuke’s
358 THQ’s Motion to Allow a Settlement with the Terminated Employees Paragraph 15. 
359 Order Authorizing Settlement with the Terminated Employees (The Court modified the automatic stay 
in conjunction with order and made the settlement binding on all employees who chose to accept it). 
360 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE. 
361 Elliott Binks, WWE News: Raw Continues to Post Impressive Ratings, We Take a Closer Look, 
BLEACHER REPORT (Mar. 13, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1565594-wwe-news-raw-
continues-to-post-impressive-ratings-we-take-a-closer-look (last visited April 23, 2013). 
362 Bill Pritchard, WWE ’13 First Week, Total Sales Numbers Are In, Wrestle Zone (Nov. 15, 2012), 
http://www.wrestlezone.com/news/264031-wwe-13-first-week-total-sales-numbers-in (last visited April 
23, 2013).
363 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 8.
364 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 8.
365 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 9.
366 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 10.
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Co., Ltd. (Yuke’s), is a publically traded company in which THQ owned 14% of the outstanding 
stock.
367
  As of the petition date, THQ owed the WWE $7.6 million in royalties and owed
Yuke’s between $15 million and $20 million for its services in developing WWE 13 and WWE 
14.
368
Despite the seemingly profitable relationship, no party entered a Qualified Bid for THQ’s 
rights to develop the WWE games pursuant to the exclusive license.
369
  This was problematic for
both THQ and its unsecured creditors.  If THQ terminated the license via rejection under Section 
365, WWE would suffer an estimated $45 million in additional damages.
370
  Because damages
from a rejected executory contract are treated as a prepetition unsecured claim, WWE and 
Yuke’s would eat away at the already limited portion of the estate intended for unsecured 
creditors.
371
Though it did not sell at the auction, the WWE license still had value to certain 
developers.  After the auction, game developer Take-Two expressed interest in entering a 
relationship with the WWE, but it was unwilling to assume THQ’s obligations under the license. 
Instead, Take-Two wanted to create a new agreement with WWE and Yuke’s to develop the 
WWE games going forward.  To facilitate this transaction, THQ filed a motion on February 12, 
2013 requesting that the Court allow it to terminate its relationship with WWE and Yuke’s, 
enabling Take-Two to enter new contracts with these entities.
372
THQ’s request had three distinct components.  First, it requested approval of an 
agreement with the WWE to terminate the exclusive license.
373
  Under the terms of this
agreement, THQ would stop all development of future WWE games and all sales of past WWE 
games.
374
  Additionally, it would pay WWE approximately $650,000 in royalties accrued during
367 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 11.
368 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 18 (Each game is developed for release in October 
of the previous year of release. For example, WWE 13 is released in October 2012, and WWE 14 is 
expected to be released in October 2013).
369 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 14.
370 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 14 (WWE claimed that, because no bidder had an 
interest, it would likely not be able to mitigate by finding another licensee).
371 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
372 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 21.
373 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 22(d).
374 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 22(d).
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the bankruptcy.
375
  In exchange, the WWE would release all prepetition claims against THQ,
including any claims that might arise from the rejection or termination of the WWE license.
376
Next, the motion requested approval of a termination of the development agreement between 
Yuke’s and THQ.  According to this termination agreement, THQ would transfer all of its 
1,552,000 shares of Yuke’s, worth an estimated $4.485 million, plus an additional $250,000 in 
exchange for a release from Yuke’s of any prepetition claims against THQ.377  Finally, the
motion requested that THQ be allowed to sell its assets related to the development of the WWE 
games to Take-Two.
378
This agreement would benefit all parties involved. THQ would substantially reduce the 
amount of unsecured claims against the bankruptcy estate, which would allow the other 
unsecured creditors to obtain a greater dividend on their claims. Furthermore, it provided WWE 
and Yuke’s with the assurance that the WWE franchise would continue to be developed.  The 
Court agreed with this and, finding the agreements reasonable and in the best interest of the 
bankruptcy estate, it approved the termination and sale agreements on February 19, 2013.
379
Remaining Issues 
Although THQ’s case is still ongoing, most of the action has settled down tremendously. 
THQ sold most of its major assets in the 363 auction, but it still possessed certain miscellaneous 
personal property that no longer benefitted the estate.  THQ continued to try to sell the personal 
property that it owned,
380
 reject the contracts for the personal property that it leased,
381
 and take
375 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 22(f).
376 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 22(e).
377 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 22(g), (h), (i).
378 Motion to Allow Settlement with WWE Paragraph 22(j) (In addition to the equipment, Take-Two 
also indicated its willingness to hire the entire THQ team involved in the development of the WWE 
games).
379 Order Authorizing the Termination Agreement with WWE (Note that since this transaction, Take-
Two has announced via its parent company, 2K Games, that it plans on releasing WWE 14 on schedule, 
promising a “commitment to authenticity,” and assuring the fans that it will contain the “signature 
gameplay” to which they have become accustomed).
380 THQ’s Motion to Allow the Sale or Abandonment of Certain Miscellaneous Property; Order 
Establishing Procedures for the Sale or Abandonment of Certain Miscellaneous Property.
381 Motion to Reject Certain Unexpired Leases of Personal Property; Order Authorizing Rejection of 
Certain Unexpired Leases of Personal Property.
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further action to reduce its holdings of property to cash.
382
  As this case involved a pre-planned
sale of THQ as a going concern, much of the action in the case took place in just two months, 
from December 19, 2012, the date of filing, to February, 19, 2013, the date in which the Court 
ordered the rejection of the real property leases, the settlement with the terminated employees, 
and the termination of the WWE contract.  Today, much of the work in the case involves 
wrapping up the remaining odds and ends.  
Attorney Compensation 
To the dismay of the unsecured creditors, a quick case does not necessarily mean a cheap 
one.  This case required extensive legal work on behalf of, among others, THQ and the 
Committee, and the lawyers were handsomely compensated for their efforts.  Gibson Dunn was 
approved for $1,137,169.75 in fees and $20,766.50 in expenses for the period from December 
19, 2012 to January 31, 2013 alone.
383
  Additionally, the firm has filed a request for $473,160.00
in additional fees to cover work done in the month of February.
384
  THQ’s other firm, Young
Conaway, also requested $403,639 in fees and $33,892.28 in expenses for work done from 
December 19, 2012 to February 28, 2013.
385
In addition to the work completed by THQ’s counsel, the lawyers representing the 
Committee have also sought compensation.  Two separate law firms, Andrews Kurth and Landis 
Rath & Cobb, represented the Committee following its formation on January 3, 2013.  As of 
January 31, a period of less than one month, Andrews Kurth had amassed fees of $432,194.50 
and expenses of $9,474.19 for which it sought payment out of the estate.
386
  Over the same
period, Landis Rath & Cobb accrued fees of $138,655 and expenses of $4,826.23 for work done 
on behalf of the Committee.
387
  In sum, attorneys’ fees totaled approximately $2.65 million as of
March, 2013. 
382 Order Authorizing Retention of a Liquidating Consultant.
383 Application of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP for Compensation for Services Rendered and 
Reimbursement of Expenses.
384 Application of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP for Compensation for Services Rendered and 
Reimbursement of Expenses.
385 Application of Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor for Allowances of Compensation and 
Reimbursement.
386 Application of Andrews Kurth LLP for Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of 
Expenses.
387 Application of Landis Rath & Cobb LLP for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses.
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Conclusion 
In just over two months, the bulk of the case is complete.  THQ, once a AAA studio 
responsible for some of the world’s most popular videogame franchises, is now essentially 
nonexistent, save for some miscellaneous property that it still retains.  Onlookers may view this 
as an unfortunate solution, as this formerly powerful company now sits gutted of its assets.  
Although a reorganization may have been more socially palatable, the public is arguably better 
off as a result of the bankruptcy.  The purchasing studios have given every indication that all 
games that THQ intended to release prior to the bankruptcy will, in fact, be released.  
Additionally, with the backing of financially solvent studios with proven success, which each of 
the buyers at the auction are, the quality of the THQ franchises should continue to improve over 
time.  Furthermore, with the exception of Vigil and THQ Agoura Hills, nearly all of the 
employees of THQ’s various studios were able to retain their jobs following the respective 
studio’s purchase.  
The benefits are significant:  jobs retained, game studios preserved, and new games to be 
released with minor delay. With the exception of the unsecured note holders and certain senior 
management, the consequences of THQ’s bankruptcy are relatively minor considering the size 
and scope of the company.  The bankruptcy process is complex and stressful for all parties 
involved.  However, as the THQ bankruptcy has demonstrated, it can be an effective tool for a 
company to restructure or eliminate debt while simultaneously preserving its day-to-day 
operations, even in the case of a going concern sale.  In this case, THQ managed to achieve this 
goal, and though it is now merely a shell of its former self, fans can still count on the release of 
their favorite THQ games from studios with a solid financial backing.  THQ will always have an 
important place in the history of videogames, and while its demise may be tragic to some, the 
fact remains that through bankruptcy, the company was able to provide its fans with their 
greatest want:  the assurance that the quality games that it has produced for years will continue to 
reach the screens of fans across the world.  Thus, while it may have been “game over” for THQ 
as a company, its games, at least for now, have an extra life. 
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Exhibit A 
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